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ABSTRACT

Education of Emotionally Disturbed Children:
A Critique of Behaviorist Trends and an

Examination of a Constructivist Alternative
September 1982
Carol C. Pope, B.A., American University
M.A.

,

Columbia University

Ed.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Louis Fischer
The dissertation examines the currently predominating

behaviorist approach in the education of emotionally

disturbed children.

It addresses both epistemological and

pedagogical inadequacies in terms of broad, general
deficits and with respect to shortcomings in four areas

deemed to be critical in the effective education of this
special group:

(a)

emotional conflict,

(b)

social, emotional and cognitive autonomy,

error, and

(d)

problems with

(c)

the role of

the role of active inquiry.

epistemology
In preface to the critique of behaviorist
to an explicaand pedagogy, an initial section is devoted

perspectives of the
tion of philosophical and psychological
behaviorism
position. The basic principles of Skinnerian
reference to the theory itself
are critically discussed with
v

.

and the practical implications that follow.

As the

behaviorist strategies are assessed in terms of the
learning needs of disturbed children, such strategies
are found to be inadequate in areas of motivation,

transfer of learning, complexity of human thought, and

with specific reference to the four areas mentioned
above
Finally, the constructivist alternative is

examined, focusing on Piaget's theory and its

implications for educational practice.

The study

concludes that a constructivist view provides a more
adequate conceptual and pedagogical model for

understanding the exceptional functioning of disturbed
children.

It is maintained that this position serves

as an effective alternative to the dominant behaviorist

paradigm.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
As a part of the general movement of the past two

decades which has given significant social and legislative

attention to children with special needs, there has been

a

rising concern about children who are emotionally disturbed
(Safford, 1978; Cruickshank, 1980).

Such children are

characterized by excessive behavior that is inappropriate
to situation and age, and is persistent or chronic.

While

the degree of severity of this behavior disorder and adaptive

impairment may vary, there are typical constellations of
interrelated symptoms.

There is, for instance, a serious

difficulty in establishing contact with peers and adults; an
impaired sense of identity that inadequately distinguishes
self from others; a distorted perception of reality and a

resistance to environmental change; an apparently irrational
level of anxiety accompanying a demonstration of innappro-

priate feelings, a pervasive mood of depression, or certain

physical symptoms such as speech defects or distorted
motility; and retardation in learning capacity on some
level

(s)

reflected in irregular academic profiles.

Estimates of the incidence of emotional disturbances
variables of
among the school population are influenced by
1
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definition and degree of severity.

Many authorities,

however, agree that close to ten percent of all school-aged

children can be classified as emotionally disturbed (U.S.
Office of Education, 1975).
An awareness of the extent of this problem, and the

special educational and therapeutic needs of disturbed
children, has spread among educators, administrators,

researchers and the general public.

Concommitently

,

through

parental or interest group pressures and legislative
mandates, there has been a significant allocation of
financial and human resources to assist these children,

thereby increasing the educational provisions and

opportunities of such pupils.
The vast majority of the programs designed to educate

emotionally disturbed children as a part of this recent
effort are governed by a behaviorist approach to teaching
and learning.

This model is essentially based on the

principles and prescriptions of

B.

F.

Skinner.

In brief,

this approach calls for a systematic study of environmental

conditions which reinforce behavior in particular ways;
these conditions and/or events are then arranged in specific

temporal relationships to the behavior in question.

Such

arrangement is based on a measurement system designed to
enable a teacher to identify environmental events which

influence the acquisition, maintenance, strengthening, or

.

3

disappearance of various types of response patterns.
There are voluminous sources in the literature that
attest to the pervasiveness of this behavioristic model as
the conceptual guide for programs educating the emotionally

disturbed (Brown

&

Herrnstein, 1975; Bullock et al.

,

1974;

Cowan, 1978; Evans, 1975; Fagen et al., 1975; Forness and

MacMillan, 1972; Garwood, 1979; Guralnick, 1977; Hammill
and Bartel, 1975; Harshman, 1969; Hewett, 1974; Koch, 1964,
1971, 1976, 1981; Joynson, 1970; Langer

,

1969; MacKenzie,

1977; Marx and Goodson, 1976; Meisels, 1979; Payne et al.,

Safford, 1978; Swanson, 1979;

1974; Rhodes and Paul, 1978;

Wedell, 1975; Wyne and O'Connor, 1979).

Statement of the Problem

Despite this major effort to improve the education
of emotionally disturbed children there has

been a growing

number of sources in recent years citing serious problems
and inadequacies in such behaviorist programs

(Swap, 1974;

Safford, 1978; Wood, 1975; Reid, 1978a; Gallagher and
Reid, 1981; and Langer, 1969)

Among the various limitations or deficiencies noted
appear to
in regard to these programs, three problem areas
be of central importance.

It is proposed here that the

program
major inadequacies are related to the following
on a
(a) curricula are typically based
characteristics:

.

4

limited understanding of the educational and socio-psychological needs of disturbed children;

selected are short-term in scope; and

(b)

(c)

the goals and skills

reasoning skills

and long-term cognitive and emotional growth are under-

emphasized

.

This view is corroborated by various students of the
field.

For instance, Miller and Dyer

(1975)

have shown

behavioral educational approaches to be initially effective,
but with

decreasing success in the long run as compared to

approaches based on active exploration.

Stallings

(1976)

supports this contention and further indicates that being

taught certain responses does not ensure that the children
possess the logic to construct similar responses themselves.
In addition to the general epistemological and

educational inadequacies of the behaviorist paradigm
addressed in this study, four specific areas will be considered in the failure of this approach to provide appro-

priately for the needs of disturbed children;
1.

To deal in educational terms with chronic

emotional conflict characteristic of disturbed children;
2.

To use error productively within the curriculum,

as well as in the general milieu of the classroom and school

community, rather than merely to avoid it;
3.

To elicit active inquiry and cognitive growth; and

4.

To foster intellectual, social and emotional

autonomy

5

Purpose and Significance of Study
In raising questions concerning the adequacy of an

educational approach, it is necessary to appraise critically

both the conceptual/epistemological foundations of the

approach and its pedagogical applications.

When this

approach is used with a specific population, it is also
necessary to assess the appropriateness of this derived
pedagogy for the particular needs and characteristics of
that population.

Consequently, this study will assess the conceptual
and pedagogical dimensions of the behaviorist approach as

represented by Skinner, with particular reference to its
adequacy for emotionally disturbed children.

After assessing

areas of inadequacy and the particular developmental needs
of this population which are not met by the behaviorist

approach, the study will examine the merits and pedagogical

implications of a "constructivist" alternative to behaviorism
for serving the unmet needs of emotionally disturbed

children.

The constructivist alternative will be discussed

primarily with reference to Piaget's formulation of
constructivism.
and
In considering the prevalent behaviorist approach

will
the constructivist alternative, particular reference
are addressed
be made to four critical areas and how they

by the two approaches.

These areas are conflict, autonomy,

6

error and active inquiry.

These are chosen for two reasons.

As indicated above, they are crucial in the development of
a healthier direction toward growth for disturbed children.

And the ways in which the areas are addressed differ in the
two approaches and highlight their significant epistemological and pedagogical contrasts.
In summary, the purpose of this study is to address

the overall question:

"What are the conceptual and peda-

gogical limitations of the behaviorist approach currently

predominating in the education of emotionally disturbed
children, and what is the rationale for, and nature of, a

constructivist alternative?"
'In

pursuing this overall purpose, the study will deal

sequentially with the following implementing questions:
1.

What is the context of behaviorism in intellectual

history, philosophy and the discipline of psychology, and

what are its essential features?
2.

What are the epistemological and conceptual

limitations of behaviorism?
3.

What are the pedagogical limitations of

behaviorism with particular reference to emotionally
disturbed children and selected learning needs?
4.

What is the epistemological and conceptual nature

of constructivism?
5.

What is the pedagogical relevance of constructivism

7

for the emotionally disturbed, and how might it be applied

to selected learning needs?

The significance of such a study lies in its

combination of a critical assessment of the behaviorist
approach for educating disturbed children, the suggested
emphasis on four critical areas for analytical and
remedial attention, and the elaboration of how such areas
are better handled through a constructivist approach.

It

could serve as a frame of reference for curriculum
planners, special education coordinators or teachers,
that differs from the prevailaing behaviorist model.

Even if the constructivist view were not to be accepted
in its entirety, the alternative has value in providing a

new perspective from which to examine the current

curriculum and needs of the emotionally disturbed.
Hopefully, this perspective and body of

recommendations can contribute to learning environments
conflict are
in which active inquiry is basic, error and

incorporated
treated appropriately, problem solving is
and where
into an individualized and emergent curriculum,
autonomy is
increasing social, emotional and intellectual
children.
an emphasized goal for disturbed

8

Scope and Procedure of Study

The term "emotionally disturbed" is used in this paper
to refer to a range of behavior disorders from mild to
It includes children who are pathologically with-

severe.

drawn from their environment as well as those who rage

openly against it.

For purposes of the study, it does not

include truly autistic children or those whose patterns are
so severe that they could not function outside a residential

placement.

Rather, the children of concern here are capable

of living with their families and attending a special day-

school or regular school as main-streamed students or

functioning within the confines of

a

special needs class.

The issues treated in this study are primarily

epistemological, pedagogical and curriculum-related.

Topics

treating the role of the teacher are strongly connected with
these issues, but will be considered beyond the scope of the
Nor will there be any attempts to deal directly with

study.

in
the therapeutic considerations or etiology of pathology

educational
the children except as they are translated into

planning.
gation.

The study is not designed as an empirical investiRather, the literature will be used to identify

position
problems inherent in the behaviorist theoretical
which these educational
and in the curricular foundation upon
are based.
programs for emotionally disturbed children

research, and is
This study is based on documentary

9

essentially designed as a conceptual study.

The preliminary

identification, and rationale for selection, of the four

critical areas

— as

already sketched out

— is

based on an

introductory survey of the literature and personal professional experience with emotionally disturbed children.
The analysis of the theoretical nature and differences of

the behavior ist and constructivist approaches, and the

critical examination of their ensuing implications for

curriculum with regard to emotionally disturbed children
are based on primary and secondary sources.

Although there

both
are many other psychologists and educators representing

behaviorism and constructivism, for the purposes of this
voices
study Skinner and Piaqet will be considered adequate
respectively to represent each approach.
Review of the Literature
relevant for this
The major categories of literature

study are those of:

(a)

behaviorist epistemology and

(b) constructivist
educational applications of the position:
applications: and (c) nature
epistemology and its educational
and educational issues or
of emotionally disturbed children

approaches pertaining to this group.

Behaviorism
this category will be the
The basic primary sources in
with emphasis on The^echnology
writings of B. F. Skinner,

10

implications of a constructivist epistemology, as do

Cognitive Development (1977) by Flavell, and Theories of
Development (1969) by Langer.
The Emotionally Disturbed
The literature in this category addresses issues of

specific psychological and educational relevance to emo-

tionally disturbed children.

like Meisel's Special

In some,

Education and Development (1979), Garwood's Educating Young

Handicapped Children (1979), and Safford's Teaching Young
Children with Special Needs (1978)

,

developmental

a

perspective is formulated and the child is basically

viewed as an activist engaged with the environment in
cognitive

,

affective and motoric ways

,

not merely as a

passive responder.
Other workds emphasize a more behaviorist-oriented
perspective, as in the following anthologies:

Harshman's

Educating the Emotionally Disturbed (1969), and Wedell's
Orientations in Special Education (1975)

.

Another

Children by
anthology. Educating Emotionally Dis turbed
Focusing
is more eclectic in its approach.
Dupont (1974)
settings, this latter
on disturbed children in educational
,

these students and
work describes the particular needs of
such needs.
offers various strategies for meeting

11

of Teaching (1968)

,

Science and Human Behavior (1953)

and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971)

.

,

In these seminal

works, Skinner elucidates his behaviorist views, the

essential thrust of which is that rewards, threats and

punishments shape human behavior patterns and that a person's
own actions, as well as the environment itself, bring
Skinner argues

consequences which in turn shape behavior.

that "people are not in any scientific sense free or

responsible for their achievements"

(Skinner, 1971, p. 125).

In this study Skinner's views will be considered

primarily in terms of their epistemological implications
and their educational relevance.

He maintains that "the

principal function of education is to transmit the culture
to enable new members of a group to profit from what others
have already learned.

It follows that the principal task

of the student is to learn what others already know"
(Skinner, 1971, p. 149).

It is basically a passive system

constructivist system.
in contrast to the active nature of a

There have been voluminous quantities of secondary
sources devoted to behaviorism and to B.
particular.

F.

Skinner in

frequently
Of these basic sources, those most

Theories of Developme_nt
used in this study will be Langer's
Prime_r (1974), and Milhollan
(1969), Carpenter's The Skinner
Contrasting Approach es
Rogersj
and Forisha's From Skinner to
to Education (1972).

which
In addition to such sources
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present, clarify and assess issues within the behaviorist

position, the Seventy-second Yearbook of the National

Society for the Study of Education, which presents an over-

view of behavior modification, is a useful source on current
theories and practices within a behaviorist pedagogy.

Constructivism
Due to the selection of Jean Piaget as the representa-

tive constructivist for this study, primary sources consist
Piaget's works that most closely address

of his works.

educational situations and pedagogical perspectives, as
well as those that deal with fundamental psychological issues

which serve as the basis for his educational position, will
These include:

be emphasized.
(1971b)

,

Science and Education

To Understand Is to Invent (1973)

ology (1970)

,

,

Genetic Epistem -

The Psychology of the Child (1969)

Psychology of Intelligence (1950)

.

,

and The

Piaget maintains that

active participation is required if the child is to transit.
form the data of his environment and thereby to "know"

and
For Piaget, knowing is an activity of the subject

knowledge is a construction.
in the subject

(knower)

,

Knowledge is neither solely

nor simply in the object to be

by the subject as
known, but instead is seen as constructed
an indissociable subject-object relation.

Knowledge is

dynamic and relational
therefore not static, but is active,

13

Piaget views the epistemological process as a structuring
of the environment according to underlying subjective

structures, or as a structuring of the subject in living

interaction with the environment.

His theory when applied

to an educational setting requires an active, inquiring

student who constructs and transforms, rather than passively
absorbs knowledge.

Three excellent secondary sources on the educational
implications of Piaget's epistemology are:

Piagetian Theory by Murray (1979)
by Furth and Wachs

(1975)

Thinking Goes to School

and Piaget, Education and

,

Teaching by McNally (1974)

,

The Impact of

.

These books share a common

virtue in deriving clear educational strategies based on
an adequate understanding of the epistemology.

There are a number of books and articles dealing with
issues of conceptual development and cognitive growth which

amplify the foundations of a constructivist approach to
education.

A two volume set of such articles, entitled

Knowledge and Development (1977, 1978), edited by Overton,

Gallagher and Easley, considers issues of
Piaget's cognitive theory,

(b)

(a)

activity in

the psychological guides

perspective,
for education according to a constructivist

and

(c)

and
the impact on educational growth of interest

autonomy.

Furth 's book, Piaget and Knowledge (1969)

on the
provides a preliminary theoretical perspective

14

Organization of Study
The study is divided into six chapters.

Following

this introduction. Chapter II focuses on behaviorism, its

philosophical lineage and place in the history of psychology,
and Chapter III addresses the epistemological limitations

and inadequacies of Skinnerian behaviorism.
In considering the pedagogical limitations of

behaviorism in Chapter IV, the discussion is focused on
educational practices and curricula in programs for emotionally disturbed, including descriptions of the learning
styles and characteristics of that population.

This chapter

also deals with the treatment given by behaviorist programs
to the areas of conflict, error, exploration and autonomy.

Constructivism, as represented by the Piagetian
position, is presented in Chapter V in terms of epistemological foundation and educational implications.
The concluding section, Chapter VI, applies construc-

tivist principles to the education of disturbed children,
again with respect to the four areas described above.

It

then suggests needs for further inquiry and development.

CHAPTER
BEHAVIORISM:

I

I

PHILOSOPHICAL AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
The history of behaviorism begins in empiricist

philosophical traditions and unfolds as a major thrust in
the emerging discipline of American psychology.

To

understand behaviorism and its powerful influence on

education throughout the last decades it is necessary to

view it against the background of its philosophical
lineage and its place in psychology.

The philosophical forebears of behaviorism, discussed
first in this chapter, are evident but not always fully

acknowledged.

They are particularly apparent in relevant

epistemological accounts.

Epistomology deals with the

the
origins and nature of knowledge as well as the nature of

constructknower; both of these dimensions are important in

behaviorism.
ing a complete philosophical context of

A

latter day
central link between empiricist epistemology and
"associationbehaviorism can be seen in empiricist-inspired

ism"

— the

are formed
view that all complex percepts or ideas

through simple association.

This associationist frame of

behavionsts and in
reference was influential among early
element of Skinner’s thought
fact represented an essential
15
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throughout his career.

While not acknowledged by Skinner, there are numerous
implicit philosophical positions, in addition to that of

associationism, behind his thought.

And either deliberately

or inadvertently he addresses issues that have persistently

occupied philosophers and others in the development of western intellectual culture.

To ignore this de facto connection

with empiricist philosophy and broader philosophical issues
would diminish our understanding of Skinnerian behaviorism.
Yet, formally Skinner takes an aphilosophical stance.

He is explicit in not providing for, or permitting, a

philosophical foundation for his behaviorist inquiry.

In

effect, he has presided over a particular twentieth century

version of psycho logy-divorced-f rom- philosophy

.

This dis-

association of psychology from philosophy has not always
been the case.

Indeed, prior to eighteenth century empiri-

cism, philosophical and psychological issues were essentially

the same, and the development of the scientific frame of

reference in nineteenth century psychology was clearly assophilociated with empiricist and later logical positivist

sophies.

Nor will the divorce necessarily hold in the

that philofuture; as will be seen, there are indications
once again. But
sophy may re-enter the field of psychology
exclusion of philoin Skinnerian behaviorism the explicit
inquiry is remarkably
sophy from scientific psychological

..

,

17

pronounced

Whether conveyed implicitly or explicitly, this

mixture of philosophical and aphilosophical underpinnings
of behaviorism needs to be acknowledged and examined as

influences
The second task of this chapter is to place behaviorism in the context of the historical development of psychology as a discipline.

more direct.

Here the linkages are clearer and

Skinner explicitly acknowledges his roots in

psychology and the connection of his formulations with those
of earlier psychologists.

The behaviorists discussed here

share Skinner's attempt to eschew concepts involving purpose
desire, intention, feeling, and so on.

Whatever the specific

differences between Skinner and his predecessors, they all
omit consideration of internal events in favor of relating

features of the environment directly to overt behavior.

Building on this discussion of the philosophical and

psychological perspectives behind behaviorism, the third
and final section of this chapter will provide an explica-

tion of Skinnerian behaviorism itself.

The basic concepts

and principles of Skinner's behaviorism will be described

separately and in terms of their places in his system as
a whole.

18

Philosophical Background

Behaviorism is an outgrowth and development from the
Empiricist philosophies of Locke and Hume.

This seventeenth

and eighteenth century tradition, itself a development from
an Aristotelian system, displays at its core this central

and dominating thesis:

a child is born empty

—a

tabula rasa

,

an open, untouched wax tablet upon which the impinging

environment etches the individual's ensuing history.
This view delineates the notion of mind as copier and
computer; the elements of experience are selected, copied,

organized, stored and processed according to the quality of
the individual's copying equipment as endowed by genetics

and shaped by the environment.

Empiricism has spawned many

forms of thought designed to reduce cognitive mechanisms to
a reproduction of reality

—a

reality having observable

features--and the resulting knowledge is then limited to the
act of transcribing and transmitting the data as carefully
as possible.

Human functioning is seen as primarily passive,

being buffeted about by an active environment.

Thus, a

developing individual comes to be who and what he is as

a

direct result of environmental impact.
Greek
The word "empiricism" is derived from the

empeiria

,

from which the English “experience" evolved.

The

is found in
earliest major philosophical use of empiricism

19

Aristotle, who conceived of experience as the yet unorganized

product of sense perception and memory.

Awareness of these

experiences is something that happens to

a person.

Indeed,

the suggestion of passivity is common to uses of the term

empiricism.

Knowledge, then, depends on the senses and what

is discovered through them.

For Locke, the "essences" of things seemed to escape

human knowledge; an external object is finally "an X,
not what."

I

know

It is this philosophical skepticism that fostered

inquiry into the power of reason and awareness of the limitations of human understanding.

It encouraged an expansion

of a different sort of knowledge attained through patient

observation and meticulous classification.

Therefore, it

was the richness of experience that accounted for information
gained, not a process of rationalizing or coming to the

essences of things.

This new focus possessed an added

bonus from a scientist's perspective:

it allowed for the

recording of data without the interpretive risk of human
decision, arbitrary judgment or subjective bias.
behaviorists
That Locke is an obvious harbinger of the

discussions on the conseto come can be clearly seen in his
educational purquences of actions being manipulated for
poses.

thought and a
He attempted to formulate laws of

concepts and then
model of the mind based on mechanical

applied this to educational issues.

,
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According to Locke, without experience there is
nothing left of knowledge of geometry or physics, and there
is no evidence to support innate human knowledge of anything

whatever.

Locke was tempted by the newly acquired precision

in natural science and sought a parallel precision for

analytic psychology in which the mind functions as

a kind

of Newtonian "empty space" with laws of association deter-

mining the ways in which sensations will be conjoined.
As was true for the behaviorists to follow, Locke was

interested in the avoidance of error while building systematically on firsthand experience, beginning with the simplest
ideas and combining them to form more complex notions that

finally serve as the basis for knowledge.*

Academic content

comprised of multiple items of information were planned by
Locke to be arranged in patterns of association, to be

programmed for maximum coverage and efficiency (Axtelle,
pp.

18-48)

.

Hume extended Locke's idea of association to

sequences of experience.

Ideas of complex occurences stem

from the association of simple events with one another.
The common notion of cause was questioned by Hume as being

neither provable by logic nor witnessed via experience.

He

*It is primarily the associationistic bent for which
Lock is remembered and which supplies the historical
beginnings of behaviorism. It is interesting to note,
emphasis
however, that he also foreshadowed Dewey in his
person
whole
the
of
education
on activity and on the
(Axtelle, p. 236).
.

.

21

realized that as functioning human beings individuals do not
doubt the reality of their impressions, but that still does
not imply logical certainty and is of limited use in

philosophy.

He continued the endeavor initiated by Locke

that would construct a "science of the mind" through careful

observation and description of ideas and "laws governing
their patterns of association."

Taking Locke's ideas onto a second plateau of empiricism, providing the reducto ad adsurdum

,

Hume analyzed the

process of human thought in the same fashion as he analyzed
the objects of that thought.

Thus, thought patterns were

artifically constructed to conform to the nature of physical
objects

— an

equation of thought process with object

processes
The empiricist view of mind is essentially analogous
to a mirror, reflecting sensations from the environment;

the 'source of mental "events" in the mind is always directly

and simply attributable to stimulation from the external
world.

The role of the subject-as-actor

,

constructing

something out of the raw elements of his environment as
they are presented or perceived is largely ruled out.

Empiricism necessarily requires a physicalist view of
unacceptable
the world in which "mental" acts are considered

or translated and reduced to physical occurrences.

This

aspect of empiricism establishes an environmentalistic

.

.
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assumption that mental occurences or psychological phenomena
are like any other natural event, a part of the physical

world or at least are reducible to physical terms in order
to be meaningful.

Three essential ingredients of this philosophical

model are:

(a)

that the mind can be analyzed into some form

of constituent elements or building blocks such as impres-

sions or associations and that the appropriate connections

can be discovered;

(b)

that external forces are impinging

on the relatively passive organism.

Thus Locke and Hume

argued that knoweldge has its source outside the individual
and that it is internalized through the senses; and

(c)

that the individual passively absorbs and accretes these

impressions

Skinnerian behaviorism is a direct descendant of the

empiricist tradition.

Skinner has inherited the mantle of

Locke and Hume, but with a shift of emphasis from sense

impressions to behavioral reaction.

Still the focus is on

the individual's reaction to environmental stimulation.

While there is clearly an advance in scientific methodology

within the modern form of empiricism, the basic thrust
remains

Behaviorism in the History of Psychology
Thorndike and Pavlov exerted great influence on the
early 20th century development of the field of psychology
and paved the way for subsequent classical conditioning

advocates such as Watson.

While it is true that for

thousands of years practices of reinforcement were invoked
to change and determine conduct, it was in the twentieth

century development of psychology that a more scientific

formulation of this ageless concept began.

Its major

statement is reflected in E. L. Thorndike's law of effect

which maintains:
Of several responses made to the same situation,
those which are accompanied or closely followed
by satisfaction to the animal, will, other things
being equal, be more firmly connected with the
situation, so that, when it recurs, they will be
more likely to recur; those which are accompanied
or closely followed by discomfort to the animal,
will, other things being equal, have their
connections with that situation weakened, so that,
when it recurs, they will be less likely to recur.
The greater the satisfaction or discomfort, the
greater the strengthening or weakening of the
bond (Thorndike, 1898).
of this
Not only was Thorndike's a more precise formulation
more solid
pleasure principle, it was also based on the

ground of experimental data.
theories
The subsequent refinements in reinforcement
mentalistic connechave largely been designed to eliminate
reinforcement concepts to the
tions either by reducing the
physical needs or by
biological processes connected with

,
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disallowing generalizations, permitting only the bare
laboratory facts to obtain.

Watson suggested a focus on the behavior of organisms
a focus which would depend directly on sense data.

He

introduced a form of behaviorism which rejected as mystical
all behavior not characterized by observability, or any

activity not reducible to a statement of physical responses.

Watson's behaviorism focused upon the characteristics of

various stimuli producing certain responses, not upon the
organism's experience of those stimuli.
a focus is the

One result of such

avoidance of mind-body connections and all

related philosophical problems raised by these connections.
He was careful to emphasize that his approach did not rule

on the presence or absence of consciousness, mental acts or

private, internal events.

His intention was to change the

focus of his emerging discipline to an examination of

observable behaviors.

A secondary effect of this focus

allowed for a consensus to be formed among investigating

psychologists working in different contexts because the
material was comprised of observable, replicable behaviors.

Watson objected not only to mentalistic frames of
reference which depended heavily on introspective inquiry,
emphasis
but he also vehemently attacked the contemporary
on instincts as explanation for motivation.

He objected to

innate, mentalistic
the assumption that these instincts were

.
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and unlearned, that they simply unfolded from within when

opportunity called them forth.

He denied the inheritance

of mental abilities, personality traits or even predispo-

sitions

.

At the forefront of the movement to change to an

aphilosophical orientation, he rejected the functionalism
of William James

field

— and

—a

heretofore powerful influence in the

sought the institution of psychology as a

mechanized, objective science.

Watson's behaviorism sought to sever any last
remnants of the relations of psychology to
mentalism and philosophical concerns. Philosophical terminology was abandoned
were eagerly
American psychologists
studying the overt behavior of human and beast,
manipulating them by applying some type of
stimulus to the organism and recording the
ensuing response (Sexton, 1978, p. 8).
.

.

.

.

.

.

Elements of shared enterprise among Watsonian,

Pavlovian and later forms of behaviorism are:
cal parsimony,
(c)

(b)

(a)

theoreti-

a bent toward practical applications,

overwhelming emphasis on reductive analyses of human as

well as animal conduct,

(d)

strict adherence to an associa-

tionistic, empiricist frame of reference,

mind-body distinctions, and

(f)

(e)

rejection of

the thesis that behavior

appearing to be the result of mental activity could be

explained behaviorally
psychological
Hull, for example, attempted to reduce

processes to a kind of biophysics.

Behavior was seen as a

.
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means of allowing an organism to resist, remove or alter
those conditions which disturb its homeostatic state.
stimulus is always physical in his system.

A

Hull employed

an objective stimulus and response analysis of behavior and

constructed a classical postulate system which served as
theory.

a

He used this theoretical system to found his notion

that no theorem's deducation would be facilitated by the

inclusion of mentalistic postulates such as consciousness
(Hull, 1942)

This developing trend in psychology had not yet made
The publication of Burnham's The

its impact on education.

Normal Mind (1924) did much to bring about the connection

with education and to create a bridge between the two
disciplines.
(a)

He maintained that education consisted of:

the selection and description of a task,

action designed to complete the task,

according to plan, and

(d)

(c)

(b)

a plan of

freedom to operate

the introduction of small incre

mental steps with little chance for failure in order to

condition a positive student response to school tasks.
witnessed
The subsequent decades, through the forties,
and a broadened
a refinement of conditioning techniques

research
application of the principles established in the
of the twenties.

There was at this time a tendency to move

as the effective
from negative to positive reinforcement

change agent in operant conditioning.
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Later, in the fifties, there was an intensified

upsurge in behavioral research resulting largely from

Skinner's burgeoning influence.

This heightened activity

provided the impetus for developing techniques and
approaches to be utilized in education and medicine as
well as in psychology.

At the time this research was

initially conducted, proponents on both sides of the
"rationalist-empiricist" controversy agreed on the necessity
of experience in the acquisition of behavior.

But the

Skinnerian approach included a determination to proceed
as if experience-based conditioning was both necessary

and sufficient to explain growth of behavior.
The sixties witnessed an intensified

emphasis by

psychologists on the connection between the child and his
learning environment.

A systematic approach ushered in

a

replacement of the haphazard techniques applied to learning

environments in previous research and practice.

This

orientation with its research findings applied to areas of
child management, motivation and classroom discipline

became the dominant trend in psychology.

From the 30s, through the period of time described
increasingly
above and into the current scene, Skinner has
levels.
influenced the field on both practical and research

from environmental
His view of behavior is that it results
if not
influences, and cognitive events are de-emphasized

.
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ignored.

Moreover, in this behaviorist view, development

itself is considered a learning process, the study of which
is effected by analyzing the situational conditions that

are antecedent and consequential to the behavior question,
as well as the contingency relationship between the behavior

and its consequences (Berman, 1978)

A major change in the Skinnerian version of behaviorism
is the attempt to remain atheoretical

,

to avoid any "explana-

tion of an observed fact which appeals to events taking
place somewhere else, at some other level of observation,

described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in

different dimensions"

(Skinner, 1950)

.

Skinner has refused

to "biologize" the concept of reinforcement.
He has refused to explain what makes reinforcers
and resisted the temptation to
reinforcing
invoke homeostatic notions, notions of 'tissueneed' drives, wants, hungers and the like
Accordingly, the laws of behavioral psychology
are no more than that collection of reliable
functional relationships resulting from the
experimental analysis of behavior (Robinson,
1979, pp. 128-129)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The Skinnerian approach is to utilize "operational

definitions," excluding terms not based on observation and
measurement.

Reinforcement, for example, is seen in terms

of probability of a given response.

Only the actual measurements of these probabilities
permits us to treat a stimulus as a reinforcer.
That is, there is no a priori classification of
stimuli as reinforcing or non-reinforcing. Put
another way, there is no deductive element in
Skinner's system (Robinson, 1979, p. 129).
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Skinner argues that the facts of behavior survive

regardless of any discoveries in physiology or neurophysiology.
ear ^^ e:i

-

^-

Like associat ionist ic theories occurring

n the history of psychology, the Skinnerian

perspective judges the organism as "empty," another kind
of blank slate upon which the environment etches.

Skinner's

aim is to establish functional relationships between

behavior and environment independently of knowledge accruing
in related fields of inquiry.

He holds that "a complete

behavioral analysis, leading to functional laws can be

conducted without reference to the physiology of the brain,
the passions of the animal, or the strivings for succes and

happiness"

(Robinson, 1979, p. 130).

Skinner's psychology, then, contains a synthesis of

elements and characteristics from associationist
ist, environmentalist and determinist positions.

,

behaviorIt repre-

sents the alignment of philosophical and psychological

threads tied together in an atheoretical but amalgamated
fashion; it encompasses a rejection of grand systematic

thinking, and the exclusive utilization of empirical,

observational data-gathering

.

The Skinnerian system repre-

sents also a culmination of the many textures being woven

through the field of psychology from the turn of the

century to the present.
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Skinnerian Concepts and Principles
Skinner's epistemological perspective, as indicated
above, is not based on a carefully formulated theoretical

position.
stance.

Indeed, he rejects any formal philosophical

Nevertheless, he has been greatly influenced by the

empiricist philosophical tradition and, like Locke and Hume,
sees association as the basis of knowledge.

For Skinner,

learning proceeds as an accretion of encounters with
stimuli, progressing from simple elements to more complex
units of knowledge.

Locke and Hume viewed knowledge as

utilizing the same building blocks:

simple sensations give

rise to simple ideas which can be rearranged to form more

complex ideas.
This principle of association in the Skinnerian system
is assumed

to govern not only the organization of (a) stimuli
in the external environment and (b) the impressions
left by these stimuli upon the person, but also
(c) the responses of the person to these impressions and (d) the response habits (tendencies)
acquired by the person. Elements in the external
environment are presumed to be there in a state
of natural association (Langer, 1969, pp. 54-55).

Skinnerian behaviorism includes the following tenets:
1.

A materialistic view of the functioning human

being and a concommitant rejection of mind-body dualism,
2.

A belief that private and public events are

functionally similar and are amenable to influence by the

,

,

.

.
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same learning principles,
3.

A rejection of explanatory frames that are

mentalistic
4.

A belief that the immediate environment is the

primary determinant of behavior,
5.

Employment of scientific methods emphasizing

systematic observation and control of behavior.
6.

A rejection of trait labels in favor of more

specific observation of particular behaviors, and
7.

A predisposition toward amassing laboratory data

without developing elaborate theoretical constructs and
generalizations
Skinner is particularly influenced by the empiricists
and in
in his quest for explanations based on observability

rejecting the notions of inner causes.

Indeed, Skinner

describing
undertakes to make observation the sole index

human thought
The System and Methodology
psychology is
The basic premise underlying Skinnerian
upon by the environment.
that organisms are basically acted

Thus
dependent
assumption is that the child is born
s
C(
the
Y
provides
r^
Don the environment, which
to
is
he
if
timulation to provoke him to respond is like a
In this the child
urvive and adapt.
set in motion by an outside
be
must
achine which
does not
In this sense, the environment
orce.
the
for)
onstitute the scene of (or occasion
ie

^

^

32

child's behavior. Rather, it is the dominant
actor in the drama of his life (Langer, 1969,
p.

64)

.

Skinner's methodology is based on a positivistic

perspective, stressing functional and quantifiable relations

gleaned from persistent observation and recording.

The

method emphasizes the operationalization of variables and
their systematic manipulation to test hypothesized relationships between behavior and environmental events.

"Skinner

believes this role is the only and the total task of
scientific inquiry"

(Wolman, 1981, p. 125).

Skinner's method, essentially an inductive one, begins

with empirical data and gradually, if at all, builds toward
tentative generalizations.

It implies a general rejection

of classification systems considered by Skinner to be super-

fluous in the effort to change or redirect a particular

piece of behavior.

His method incorporates the assumption

processes
that neither mental events nor internal states and
such a study
are relevant to a proper study of behavior;

dependence on such
can be successfully accomplished without
the organism,
information. Sufficient variables lie outside
study, or can be
immediately available for observation and
that adequate
obtained from environmental history so
with reference only
scientific analysis can be carried out
to these.
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The Principles and Elements

From laboratory investigations based on this methodological approach, Skinner developed a series of principles
or components that are central to his system.

The following

elements, which build upon the earlier empiricists and

behaviorists

,

are marked by Skinner's particular emphasis.

Respondent Behavior /Respondent Conditioning

.

According

to basic behaviorist tenets, respondent behavior is elicited

unconditionally by some known and observable stimulus.

It

is essentially reflexive behavior, not subject to volitional

control.

Associated with this behavior is a directly

related form of conditioning:

respondent conditioning, of

which the classical Pavlovian conditioning is the prototype.
A new stimulus is paired with one previously eliciting

a

particular response and after a given number of repetitions
the response is also elicited by the new stimulus.

Skinner accepts the importance of this behaviorist

principle only insofar as it explains the process by which
new stimuli come to elicit old responses.

He maintains,

however, that this form of conditioning has little impact
responses
on human behavior nor does it explain how new
are acquired.

Operant Behavior /Operant Conditioning

.

Within the

conditioning are
Skinnerian framework, operant behavior and
of human functioning.
the critical factors in the dynamics

.
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Operant behavior is roughly equivalent to voluntary behavior.
It operates on the environment to generate consequences.
It is this behavior which serves as the primary focus of

Skinnerian study designed to assess how this behavior changes
in response to variations occurring in the environment.

Operant conditioning is the controlling behavior in

reaction to consequences produced.

There is a significant

difference between this operant conditioning and the classical conditioning of earlier behaviorists

.

Both acquire a

relation to previous stimuli, but in operant conditioning
the prior stimulus becomes the occasion for the operant

behavior, but is not an eliciting stimulus.

The antecedent

becomes the cue for the emission of an operant response,
of
its actual occurence depends on a complex variety

conditions.
is important.

But it is not the cue-response connection that

Rather, the emphasis is on the response and

how it is reinforced.
renders a
It is often the functional status that

behavior operant or respondent.

For example, a newborn

to hunger or other
infant emits cries as orimary reactions
time uses the
physical discomfort; that same infant in
signal for help which
behavior differently— as a distress
before. This latter
has been answered in many instances

consequences ensuing in the
form of crying is dependent on
operant
environment and is then considered

.
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Skinner's approach, then differs from earlier

behaviorists primarily in this emphasis on response
consequences rather than their antecedent stimuli.

In

what he feels is the absence of knowledge regarding the

controlling stimuli for most behaviors, Skinner proposed
this operant paradigm which affords a practical system

easily applicable to problems of human life.
Thus Skinner revises Thorndike's Law of Effect as
follows:

"Instead of saying that a man behaves because of

the consequences which are to follow his behavior, we simply
say that he behaves because of the consequences which have

followed similar behavior in the past"
p.

87)

(Skinner, 1938,

.

Reinforcement

According to Skinner, the agency that
It is the

shapes behavior is the process of reinforcement.

necessary element in developing and maintaining
ated operant.

a

discrimin-

A reinforcer is determined by its effect upon

response emission.

For Skinner, a stimulus becomes a rein-

forcer if it increases the probability of a response.
is,

That

it becomes a reinforcer for similar responses emitted

in the future and prediction can be made based on the

increasing frequency of the behavior
Thus, when reinforcement follows a given act or piece

given
of behavior, the frequency is likely to increase

similar conditions.

Skinner also interprets this the other
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way around:

any piece of behavior occurring with some

frequency is assumed to have been reinforced.
Skinner admits that human action is too complex to

make simple connections between cause and resulting action.
Instead of dealing with cause and effect he attempts to

identify functional relationships between the environmental

conditions and changes in the frequency of specific actions.
His emphasis is placed on how behavior is modified in rela-

tion to environmental feedback, i.e., in relation to the
kind, intensity, and frequency of reinforcement.

Positive Reinforcement involves the providing of

something desirable to the learner, such as food, money or
praise in order to increase the probability of a given

behavior's recurrence.

A consequence that is pleasantly

rewarding to the learner in some way increases the possibility that the behavior which produced that particular
response will be repeated.

Negative Reinforcement

,

contrary to popular under-

standing, is not identical with punishment.

It is the

removal of aversive, uncomfortable or unpleasant stimuli,
so
resulting in the increasing frequency of the behavior

reinforced.

that
An individual discovers through experience

situation by exhibiting
he can escape from an uncomfortable

certain behavior.

Having discovered the consequence of

the behavior whose
escape, the learner is likely to repeat
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consequences led to the absence of the unpleasant or
negative reinforcer.

Punishment
(a)

.

Skinner views punishment in two ways:

as the presentation of aversive stimuli or negative

reinforcers, and

(b)

as the removal of positive reinforcers.

He distinguishes between the removal of positive reinforcers

to extinguish a response and the withdrawal of a reinforcer

Only the latter is punish-

when contingent on a response.
ment

.

Skinner considers the use of punishment generally
inefficient.

He proposes instead that society adopt

measures of positive reinforcement which are both more
efficient and effective.

In his view punishment tends to

suppress behavior, not change it.

The desirable effects

of applying punishment are usually short-lived while the

undesirable effects, such as anxiety and unhappiness, are

often prolonged.
Schedules of Reinforcement
rewards in many varied patterns
and according to situation.

,

.

The environment yields

with changes over time

Skinner has thoroughly investi-

gated these schedules, or arrangements of reinforcements,
to determine their influence on behavior.

One such arrangement is continuous reinforcement,

between
which represents a one-to-one correspondence

particular response and a rewarding consequence.

a

It is

.
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primarily the physical, mechanical aspects of human

environment which can be characterized as reinforcing in
this manner.

Devices and appliances fall into this

category in which appropriate function (or reward) is

expected every time.

The higher incidence of consistency

in the physical world, as opposed to the human social

context, accounts for this kind of reinforcement.

Skinner

has found that this continuous reinforcement has a disad-

vantage of producing extremely low frustration levels and

concomitant lack of perseverance in the subjects so
reinforced
An alternative pattern of reward is intermittent

reinforcement

,

which does not reward an appropriate act

every time one occurs.

The social environment or human

sphere of influence tends to reward more unevenly, more

erratically than the physical environment.

The occurence

of reward is difficult to predict because the contributing

factors are highly complex and dynamic.

There are specific varieties of intermittent rein
forcement, based on the dimensions of the interval between

reinforcements and number of occurences.

A fixed-interval

standardschedule is one in which reinforcement occurs at

every six
ized intervals, e.g., every five minutes, or
reinforces at unstanweeks. A variable-interval schedule
fixed rati o refers
dardized and irregular time periods. A
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to a schedule which reinforces regardless of time elapsed.
In contrast, variable- ratio refers to the reinforcing of

responses in varying groups, e.g.

,

after the first two

responses, after the sixth, the twentieth, etcetera.

Skinner and his colleagues have examined these

varieties of intermittent reinforcement in detail (Ferster
and Skinner, 1957).

Each variety and its combination with

another has been found to have predictable effects on the

frequency of operant responses.

For example, the fixed-

ratio schedule tends to increase persistence and maintain

uniform response rates; the variable-ratio produces even
greater perseverance with greater extinction resistance.
Under a fixed- interval schedule, work output does not remain
constant; under a variable-interval schedule, the effect is
a high and consistent rate of response, with persistence

over time.

There is then a generalized notion of the contrast

between continuous and intermittent reinforcement
their effects in practical application.

,

and

"The continuous

schedule is important in acquiring new behavior.

But the

response
intermittent schedules are necessary for building

strength " (Carpenter, 1974, p. 31).

Skinner's discovery of

empirical investigations
this relationship derives from his
experiences of daily life
and consequent application to the
affords greater
The recognition o f this relationship
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efficiency in the use of behaviorist techniques.
The primary tool in the Skinnerian repertoire is

differential reinforcement

which occurs when small changes

,

in performance produce a significantly different outcome.
It is the mechanism of shaping through successive approxi-

mations that gradually leads to refinements in skilled
behaviors.

This process can be analyzed into six basic

steps:

identification of an effective reinforcer,

(b)

(a)

specification of acceptable steps toward that target

behavior,

(c)

selection of an approximate current response

to reinforce temporarily,

(d)

withdrawal of reinforcement

once the approximate behavior pattern stabilizes,

(e)

selection of a closer approximation after behavior has
become more variable again,

(f)

extinction of this new

response in favor of a still closer approximation, and so
on until target behavior is achieved.

Skinnerian use of

via
this form of reinforcement has been widely publicized

pigeon ping-pong.
Control

.

Psychology's task, according to Skinner, is

an effective,
to predict and control behavior, to generate
with which to accomplish this assign-

efficient methodology
ment.

functioning in
He believes controls are constantly

understanding and enlight
any case, so that a more thorough
result in better
ened harnessing of these controls will

conditions of life (Skinner, 1953

,

p.

17 ).

.
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The thesis of Beyond Freedom and Dignity is that a

science of human behavior must be developed, one which will

transcend the teleological, "pre-scientif ic " thinking so

objectionable to Skinner.

The environmental control

exacted on human behavior should be acknowledged and its

beneficial aspects encouraged, i.e., seeking the positive
reinforcers within this control (Skinner, 1971).

The

primary aim of his behavioral science is the same prediction
and control brought to bear by the hard sciences.

Skinner maintains that human society can, in this

modern age, no longer afford to ignore the controlling
environment, that an attempt must be made to develop

systematic control over those conditions and circumstances
that shape human behavior

CHAPTER
BEHAVIORISM:

III

CRITIQUE OF

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Before analyzing the appropriateness of behaviorist

pedagogy for the particular needs of emotionally disturbed
children, it is first necessary to assess the soundness of
the conceptual framework out of which that pedagogy is

derived.

After presenting a brief overview of major

criticisms, the chapter will discuss a series of limitations
in orientation and concept that characterize this formula-

tion.

Overview
The weaknesses of Skinnerian behaviorism lie, first
of all, in its epistemological limitations.

It has failed

to provide any real philosophical foundation for its

enterprise or to elucidate any but the narrowest conception
of science as a process.

A related problem is its failure

to recognize in its own functional framework a difference

from the other "hard" sciences with regard to subject

matter.

often
In psychology man is both the inquirer and

the ultimate experimental subject.

The significance of

is the interthis relationship is ignored by Skinner, as
between man and
active dynamic between the two roles, and

his environment generally.
42
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In emulating physics and biology, Skinner has

restricted admissability of evidence with
intensity than his models.

a

greater

He has honed the criticism of

"observability" until its sharp focus rules out much that
is relevant in the study of human behavior.

Skinner's preoccupation with amassing detailed data
and avoiding theory, as if he were emulating the sciences,

results in significant problems.

Transferring his data

gleaned from animal research to applications regarding
human behavior is done on tenuous grounds with concommitent

problems concerning the issue of human behavior.
Finally, the failure of a behaviorist system

adequately to account for the complexity of human behavior
is the most all-encompassing criticism, one which, in the

ultimate analysis, might prove most significant.

Rejection of Philosophical Foundations

Behaviorism has, from the inception of its influence,
been more concerned with its qualifying as a science than

with determining its own broad range of significant subject

matter or its appropriate rationales and philosophical
bases for selecting that subject matter.

Its history has

been largely a matter of emulating the methods, forms, and
symbols of the established sciences, especially physics,"

while actually retreating from the task of constructing
for so doing
its own discipline "and forming rationales

.

,
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which could only invite further retreat" (Koch, 1961,
p
629)

.

The retreat continued.

The dramatic split between

psychology and any philosophical or theoretical underpinnings intensified.

Sexton (1978) views this alienation

from philosophy as a restriction of psychology's true

growth as a human science.

In its effort to conform to

overly narrow conceptions of its enterprise, Skinner's

psychology has paid a great price:

a

loss of direct

contact with human experience in a larger pattern of

relationships and complexities and a fostering of the view
that scientific psychology must be reductionistic

"Individual experience was either ignored or reduced to

something else.

It became so totally objectified that the

person whose experience it was, was ignored"

(Sexton, 1978).

Philosophers themselves have reinstated much of what
was initially rejected in the positivist era of influence

which Skinner continues to maintain.

Carnap, as a leading

positivist, admitted that

although many of the alleged results of introspection were indeed questionable, a person's
awareness of his own state of imagining,
feeling, etc., must be recognized as a kind of
observation, in principle not different from
external observation, and therefore as a
legitimate source of knowledge, though limited
by its subjective character (Carnap, in Feigl
and Scriven, 1956, pp. 70-71).
Skinner's lineage from the empiricists and positivists

.

,
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then, continues unabated and virtually untouched despite

the disaffection of scientists and philosophers alike

who now reject these restrictive bases for their own
disciplines.

Skinner's behaviorism "is thus in the

unenviable position of standing on philosophical foundations which began to be vacated by philosophy (itself)

almost as soon as the former had borrowed them"
1964, p.

(Koch,

5)

Another critic of the objectivist thrust in behaviorism is R. B. Joynson, who finds in its record not a

scientific advance but an intellectual retreat.

According

to Joynson, behaviorism has either repeatedly failed to

restrict its inquiry to the external conditions it respects
or has attempted to include internal conditions via

indirect methods
inadequate.

.

In either case

,

the results are

Furthermore, if behaviorists choose to await

advances in neurphysiology on which to found its experiments
as Skinner often indicates, what difference will they

claim for their endeavor to distinguish it from neuro-

physiology itself?

(Joynson, 1970)

future enterprise is futile

— "a

.

Waiting for such a

future which lifes after

the grave, since that stage is no longer psychology"
(Scriven, 1964, p. 68).
to
Marx and Goodson (1976) have lent their voices
field of psychology
this critical outcry. They describe the

.

.

.

46

as currently experiencing a reaction to the intense

behaviorist influence exerted over the last decades.

They

forecase a growing revival of interest in philosophical
issues and perspectives, a rediscovery of mind and

consciousness

—a

revival that would correct what they view

as an imbalance created by a rigid behaviorism.

Failure to Recognize Psychology's
Difference from "Hard" Sciences
Skinner ignores the self-referent nature of his

particular discipline.
out,

As Scriven (1973, p. 426) points

"thinking that p is true never makes it true when p

is a proposition about planets,

[yet]

the opposite is

often the case when p is about people."

This suggests

that Skinner's determination to place psychology parallel
to, say, astronomy or physics will not work because of the

difference in the relationship of inquirer to his subject

matter
The inescapable fact is that this beliefcontrollability makes man most unlike planets
In part, it means that some of
and atoms.
man's internal states which are involved in
his information-processing and informationacquiring activities and of which he is aware
by his own perceptions of his own brain states
(i.e., introspection) often dominate his overt
behavior, explain it, and even control the
truth of predictions about his later behavior.
That is what sticks in Skinner's craw (Scriven,
1973, p. 427)

reference to its
This reductionism with particular
to many
application to human behavior is objectionable

.
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critics in trivializing the sum of human functioning.
focuses on small increments, on manageable bits.

It

According

to Maslow, Skinner is "guilty of attempting to define the

whole phenomenon of the human being in terms of the parts
[he]

can manipulate well"

(Maslow, 1966, p. ix)

Skinner refuses to acknowledge the meaning lost in

disallowing a larger picture of human behavior and instead
insists that eventually there will be sufficient accretion
of data to give a whole picture.

Failure to Acknowledge
Interactive Elements
Critics have objected to the obvious lack of inter-

action within Skinner's behaviorist approach, between
subject and object, between the experimenter and the

experimental subject, between the knower and the known,
and between a person and his environment.

As Riegel

(1978)

views the issue, "the conditioner engages in a lopsided
exchange" in which he is unaware of the mutuality of the

conditioning process.

Instead of viewing this process

Skinnerians have
as a two-way, interactive enterprise,
and
typically and uncritically retained their biased

assymetric form of empirical endeavor.
of the
Because Skinner fails to recognize the power
of the relationinteractive influence, his interpretation
and his experiship between experimenter or conditioner

.
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mental subject assumes unnecessary restrictiveness.
Breger (1969) accuses Skinner of being "scientistic"
rather than scientific in his method of relating

experimenter to subject in such a way as to set the
experimenter up as "objective fact-gatherer."
Between humans and their environment, the reciprocal
sources of influence are separable for experimental

purposes, but in everyday experience, interaction is

evident and the two exert influence concurrently.

Behaviorists have taken this one-sided paradigm to its
extreme in their mapping of what is functionally a

bi-directional process.

Environmental control is over-

studied and overemphasized in the behaviorist literature

whereas personal control is essentially neglected.
There has been much data issuing from the field of

biology demonstrating the constant interactions of
organisms with their environment.

The relative passivity

which has been imputed to the organism, particularly by
behaviorist oriented researchers, has become less tenable
than ever.

It is, then, the clearly demonstrable activity

even in lower organisms that points to a role for man more

active than empiricist/behaviorist orientations have
allowed
The exact counterpart of behaviorist empiricism
in biologic theory is a doctrine long since
abandoned by biology itself, not because it was
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wrong in what it maintained but because it
ignored all that has since proved essential
to an understanding of the relations between
the organism and its environment (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1976, p. 25).
There is a certain irony in Skinner's contending
that people are controlled by their environment, then on
the other hand suggesting they redesign their society by

applying principles of behaviorism.

"If humans were in

fact incapable of influencing their own actions, they

could describe and predict environmental events but hardly
exercise any intentional control over them" (Bandura,
1974).

Thus, because of the capacity for reciprocal

influence which Skinner neglects, people are at least

partial architects of their own destinies and are therefore

more active entities in the process than Skinner is

willing to acknowledge.
Rejection of Explanatory Structures
Skinner's interpretation of scientific inquiry in

psychology proves more restrictive than that utilized in
the "hard" sciences he seeks to emulate.

Physicists and

biologists might replace inner state explanations whenever

possible with more quantifiable explanations, but they do
not automatically reject what might be meaningful, productive information simply because it is not quantifiable.

Moreover, there are many examples in these "hard"
significant
sciences where inner states are invoked as
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explanatory aids.

Biology, for example, commonly uses the

notion of self-regulation which Skinner would reject as
untenable in psychology.

He has essentially ignored the

use of such terms in other fields and instead tends to see

such "internal" concepts as harking back to the pre-scientific, superstitious thinking he hopes psychology will

rise above.
An empiricist-based epistemology cannot explain

adequately the discipline of mathematics which deals

essentially with unobservable features
constructions.

and with cognitive

It ignores the frequent use in other

fields of linguistic structures, social structures, atomic

structures, mathematical structures, to name just a few.

What Skinner fails to acknowledge is that physical

characteristics and behaviors do not necessarily exhaust
the class of meaningful events

Hanson

1958)

,

(Anderson, 1974; Kuhn, 1970;

.

"The problem is that as a purely descriptive enter-

prise with official sanctions against biological and

cognitive theorizing,

[behaviorism] is not equipped even

as
in principle to embrace such subjects and processes"

found in the study of human behavior (Robinson, 1979,
p.

140)

.

Skinner suggests that the use of such explanatory
structures puts
constructs as self-regulation or cognitive
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an end to inquiry and results in what he sees as incom-

pleteness of explanation.

Yet his behavioristic explana-

tion goes no further toward completeness

— one

can always

question the power of a reinforcer; why is it reinforcing?
Skinner's intense rejection of such constructs is,
of course, throwing out the baby with the bath water.

Contrary to the Skinnerian perspective, science has often
advanced its scope of knowledge by explaining the observable
in terms of the unobservable, e.g., atomic structure.

Skinner assumes that the domain of observability is
His blindness in this regard leads him to

rigidly fixed.

repudiate the notion of structural concepts on the grounds
that they are unobservable.

But "this policy not only

excludes most of what is usually considered science, but
regulates what is supposed to represent the epitome of
human intellectual achievement to the lowest common denominator in man's understanding"

(Anderson, 1974, pp. 14-15).

The reductionism is the source of voluminous quanti-

ties of criticism from virtually every discipline.

Robinson (1979, p. 138) speaks eloquently of this issue:
"As Skinner

.

.

.

has moved beyond the data

.

.

.

as he

of the law of
has attempted to include under the umbrella

the Skinnerian
effect the entire range of human activities,
His reduction
system has repeatedly foundered and failed."
and "latent
of such functions as language, "insight"

.
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learning" to associational principles has "strained the

tether of plausibility."
Critics who attack Skinner for his reductionism are

certainly aware of the importance of analyzing behavior
in assessing complex concepts.

It is true, however, that

while a notion like "cognitive structure" cannot be

adequately evaluated without reference to specific behavior,
this does not imply that the structure can therefore be

reduced to behaviors (Anderson, 1974)

.

Skinner disclaims these constructs because they are
"mentalistic

.

"

In so doing he confuses the procedures of

science itself with terminology.
He apparently belives that if he rephrases
mentalistic expressions with terminology
then he has
derived from the laboratory
achieved a scientific analysis of behavior.
[Yet] it would be hard to conceive of a more
striking failure to comprehend even the
rudiments of scientific thinking (Chomsky,
.

.

.

1971, p. 23)

Chomsky views the Skinnerian enterprise as a set of

arbitrary restrictions on "legitimate" theory construction
an unnecessary shackling that physical scientists would

find an intolerable abridgement of intellectual pursuit
(Chomsky, 1971, p. 23).

Limitations of an Atheoretical Stance
behaviorism
Skinner often implies that a rejection of
is tantamount to a rejection of Darwinism.

A critical
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response to this would include the notion that
the psychological features of human life are
data that a Darwinian theory must be able to
explain. Facts are not eliminated by invoking
Rather,
a theory unable to account for them.
theories are rejected when they are unable to
assimilate the facts (Robinson, 1976, p. 408).

According to Skinner, we enter upon theorizing when
we ask "why?"

— why

a

reinforcer acts as such.

His own

account of his work procedure suggests a simple following
of a trail wherever it leads, disregarding theoretical

constructs, allowing himself as experimenter to be reinforced in one direction of investigation rather than

another by the responses of his rats or pigeons (Skinner,
1959, pp. 80-89; 1971, p. 170).

Yet, he assumes order is

there to be found and that inner states are irrelevant

(a

prejudice reinforced by his selection of rats and pigeons
and not monkeys or men)

.

And he does in fact sort relevant

from irrelevant observations by reference to a given line
of inquiry.

Furthermore, he generalizes his findings to

and
other areas of investigation, e.g., social sciences
not
education. These practices all possess theoretical,

simply empirical procedural elements.

"In refusing to

reductionism is
admit that this is the case, Skinner's
itself reduced to special pleading"

(Hill, 1971, p.

239).

solely on
Furthermore, his determination to focus

selection of a
external behavior itself results in the
inquiry into more
model of sorts— a model which excludes

.
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inclusive and enduring phenomenal systems such as
"dispositions

,

"

"personality," "social institutions," etc.

Skinner's comments on these levels of inquiry "imply that
they will only become scientific when the effort is made
to reduct them to itemized accounts of specific overt

responses"

(Hill, 1971, p. 232).

Preoccupation with Quantifiable Data
There is a tendency in our modern scientifically-

oriented society to feel comforted that knowledge is

advancing if tables of data are being amassed on a grand
Yet the greatest advances in scientific fields have

scale.

come from shifts in perspective, not from the accumulation
Such incrementalism creates a false sense of

of data.

progress
This emphasis on "incrementalism" combined with

Skinner's aloofness toward meaningful theoretical structure
has resulted in a profession in which the measurement is

emphasized out of proportion to its subject matter.
Related to this issue is "mensurationalism

,

"

according to

which the validity of an observation is directly proportional to the accuracy of the measurement
p.

277)

.

(Robinson, 1979,

come
But have the important advances in science

through such tiny, measured increments?

The revolutions

Copernicus or even
of thought sparked by Darwin, Freud,
theories were recorded in equations were

Einstein whose
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not significantly couched in terms of incremental observa-

tions or measurement, but rather by totally new theoretical

conceptions in their respective fields.
It is not that what Skinner does is unimportant.
is rather that it is not all-important.

It

"It will not spell

'truth' no matter how accurate it is; it will not yield a

theory," even though it may figure in assessing one.

"Measurement is an instrument of discrimination, not the
(Robinson, 1979, p. 278).

tool of invention"

Skinner has chosen the minor role of measurement,
not a more major one of using measurement to learn some-

thing about nature.

Without a cohesive theory, a more

significant role evolving from measuring incremental
changes is unattainable.
The kind of thinking represented in Skinnerian

behaviorism is seen by critics to embody the narrowest
elements and applications of the scientific enterprise.
result
"It presumes that knowledge is an almost automatic
of gimmickry, an assembly line
as the result of

.

.

.

regarding knowledge

'processing' rather than discovery"

(Koch, 1969, p. 2).

Contrasted with intellectual enter-

relationships
prises based on the search for meaningful
appears obsessive
among elements and ideas, behaviorism
of inquiry.
in its focus on such narrow conceptions
system fails to account for the full range

Skinner's

.
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of behaviors in even an impoverished Skinner-box

environment, and can therefore hardly do justice in

accounting for the complexities of human life.

Such

important and traditional topics of psychology as
cognition, concept formation, personality and mentation
have been ignored, denied or trivialized.
We have been badly oversold on the classical
experimental model as a means of studying
such central aspects of human psychology as
cognition. Too much evidence obvious and
available evidence is ignored because it
fails to conform to our prejudices about
how empirical information arises (Deese,
1969, p. 519)

—

—

Problems in Transferring Animal
Research Data to Human Behavior
"The main crack in the tight Skinnerian system

occurs when Skinner begins to extend his principles to

behavior beyond the laboratory" via methods of analogy
and extrapolation (Carpenter, 1974, p. 95).

First, there

stretched
is the question, how far can an analogy be

between animal and human behavior?

Skinner's rationale

for the use of analogy is vague at best.

More interesting

to estimate
still is his use of extrapolation, which means
beyond its known
the value or significance of a variable

range.

that it
The weakness of operant extrapolation is

human learning as
tends to underrate the complexity of
that Skinner has
compared to animal learning. The fact
identify the variables
not made any concerted effort to

.
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that are peculiar to human learning, that is, beyond those
found in the conditioning of rats, places his extrapolations
on rather shakey grounds
In transferring research data from animals to humans

Skinner claims two assumptions to be valid:

a)

the

assumption of environmental generality which asserts that
a Skinner box,

for example, is meaningfully representative

of other environments

,

and

b)

the assumption of speciea-

tional generality which asserts that a pigeon or a rat is

meaningfully representative of other species.

It is the

combination of these two assumptions that forms the basis
for Skinner's extrapolations from his research to situa-

tions of human behavior.
In less rigidly restricted environments, character-

istic of the human experience, "the variability of behavior

becomes so great that the only descriptive generalizations
of
that can be made applicable throughout the range
as
environmental conditions are those so broad and diffuse

to be practically meaningless"

(Mackenzie, 1977, p. 162).

at the
The greater attention by critics is directed
1977;
specieational assumption (Beach, 1950; Mackenzie,
There are major differences in behavior
Seligman, 1970)
and compardifferent species even in highly controlled
.

of

differences sufficiently
able experimental environments,
variability in behavior.
great that there is an observable

.

.
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This refers even to the differences between rats and
pigeons, a difference which compounds when extrapolated
to humans

Langer questions the utility of behaviorist animal

research in its applications to human growth in that it
ignores significant differences that would change an

interpretation of a given piece of behavior.

For example,

in Skinner's pigeon ping-pong, people might play to lose
so that each gets reinforced more often or to stop playing

such a silly game (Langer, 1964, p. 61).

These options

are clearly not within the pigeon repertoire.

Another aspect of critical response to transfer of
animal to human behavior is the complaint that behaviorism
fails to recognize the rational and intentional elements
of human behavior.

In seeking purely observational,

descriptive accounts of human behavior

,

Skinner ignores

reasons for behavior, the motivation behind an act which
he maintains to be scientifically irrelevant.

Behaviorism fails adequately to account for language,
essentially
and to consider this facet of human behavior as

differentiating humans from other animals.

"If a study of

as an
mankind does not regard man's possession of language

animals,
essential difference between man and the lower

then

I

should not know what was meant by 'essential

(Malcolm, 1964, p. 153)

.

.

.
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Inadequacy of Skinnerian
Account of Human Freedom
The extremely important and sensitive issue of
human

freedom is a crucial epistemological pitfall for Skinner.
He constructs an adamant correspondence between
science

and the lack of freedom on the one hand, and between pre-

science and autonomy on the other.

It is by no means an

accepted correspondence within the scientific community
(Koch, 1964, 1971,

1975, 1981; Scriven, 1964, 1973;

Robinson, 1976, 1978; Riegel, 1979; etcetera)
In fact, his adamance on this point has itself been

termed unscientific in that he claims science will inevitably show that man is unfree

(Skinner, 1971) whereas scien-

tific inquiry dictates that a proposition remain open to
the possibility of disconf irmation (Anderson, 1974)

Scriven poses a less trivial and more dignified view
of human freedom, which he defines as one being capable

and able to do something besides what one does.

He main-

tains that freedom

dwells within and at harmony with the constraint
of natural and psychological laws. The crucial
question is not whether our actions are probablistically determined, but whether they are
wholly determined by external factors which
override any variation in mental state in
which case we are not free--or whether one of
the intervening determinants is a mental state
or event such as preferring or choosing (Scriven,

—

1973, p. 440)

The critics of behaviorism who insist that "autonomous

.
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man" is a meaningful concept are not necessarily maintaining

that man's abilities to deliberate, judge or create are

totally beyond the natural laws and regularities of the
world.

They are stating that these behaviors fill everyday

experience and behaviorism cannot adequately account for
them.

It is not a question, then, whether man can disregard

physical or natural laws and thereby be autonomous; rather
it obtains that man may be autonomous in disregarding the
laws of behavior as delineated by behavior ists

Skinner's notion of freedom is essentially one

focusing on its defensive aspect
unpleasant, undesirable events.

— that

is, the freedom from

As such, it fails compre-

hensively to cover all useful definitions of freedom.
Actions like thinking, deliberating, reflecting are all
unobservable; hence, according to Skinnerian criteria,
they are not usable or meaningful in his system.
theless, they do function as forms of freedom.

Never-

Creative

freedom, for example, is not based on avoidance or escape

from anything.

Rather it is a conscious, deliberate

search for innovative alternatives.

It is often pursued

despite the consequences and though it may itself create
more problematic conditions or questions.
Thus, Skinnerian freedom is not broad enough to

account for all kinds of meanings of the term.
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General Explanatory Inadequacy
It is apparent, then, that many critics believe that

neither Skinner's philosophy of science (or lack thereof)
nor his conception of (or at least assumptions about) human

beings is tenable (Anderson, 1974; Koch, 1964; Robinson,
1976, 1979; Riegel, 1978, among others).

It is also clear

that most critics find interesting insights and valuable

empirical information ensuing from Skinner's method of
inquiry.

There have been important types of applications

based on his studies.

It is unlikely that educators or

psychologists would deny the value of some of Skinner's
contributions.

All of this, however, does not serve as

justification for Skinner's position as a system of
thought or as a sufficient theoretical point of departure
for practical applications.
It is the contention of the present study that while

the critical appraisals discussed above have merit and

touch on sensitive areas of behaviorism, the most important

critique remains the claim of general explanatory inadequacy.

The point is not that behaviorism is incorrect,

but that it is inadequate for the task of explaining all

that has been observed about how people learn.
This explanatory weakness of the Skinnerian position
theory of how
is in part due to its resting on a black-box

humans work.

"Black-box" refers to a procedural system in

.
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which empirical events are amassed but are not related to
a consistent overarching theory or to an understanding of

the reasons or causes of the events.

It is comparable to

an engineer who calculates the tensile strength of struc-

tural members, but does not know why given materials act
as they do.

This manner of functioning may, or may not,

be adequate for the successful construction of a building,

but it does not provide a basis for a scientific under-

standing of relevant data or reasons for their occurrence.

When applied to how people learn, observable learning
events are amassed without inclusion of the unobservable
facets or outcomes of the process

,

without an adequate

theoretical framework for dealing with causation.

The

black-box approach explains some things, but not all
things, about learning.

It does not provide a truly

scientific basis for inquiry and explanatory analysis,
despite Skinner's protestations of behaviorism's scientific
stance
The Skinnerian framework presents difficulty in

explaining some important dimensions of the cognitive
process.

For instance, while Skinner acknowledges that

he hardly
internal processes such as human reasoning exist
the phenomdoes justice to them. This is partly because
of it, tends
enon of human reasoning, and an explanation
only empirical
to be elusive for an approach that allows

.

63

data.

It stems

,

too, from Skinner's tendency to lose sight

of the interaction between reason and experience.

The approach is also problematic for analyzing or

explaining the concept of understanding itself.

Deese,

for example, came to reject his own experimental background

upon confronting its inadequacy in dealing with this
concept.

He could find no way to link understanding or

interpretation with particular behavior, no way to tie
them to dependent variables or specific measures of behavior.
Yet he notes that
the concept is central to the theory of human
thought, and any attempt to eliminate or ignore
it, in the interest of making psychology
conform to the reputed canons of experimental
Such
inference, is worse than misguided.
attempts are responsible for the sterility of
much experimental study of cognition (Deese,
1969, p. 517)
In other fields, when laws or theories or positions

fail to account for all the data, they are usually

supplanted by a revised formulation or an entirely

different foundation which more adequately accounts for
the data.

In psychology, critics of Skinner have often

turned towards Piaget on these grounds.

Thus one critic

claims that Skinnerian behaviorism cannot account for the

intellectual and moral phenomena described by Piaget,
while a Piagetian system of explanation can account for
all behavior described by Skinner (Kamii, 1979)

extends this point:

.

Kamii

.
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I have seen many psychologists who changed from
behaviorist or associationist views to a
Piagetian outlook. However, I have never known
a Piagetian who later became a behaviorist.
Once a person understands a more adequate theory
(e.g., the heliocentric theory), he cannot go
back to a more limited outlook (e.g., the geocentric theory) (1979, p. 31)

Can a conceptual framework that has significant

explanatory limitations be an adequate guide for an applied
pedagogy to meet a broad variety of learning needs?
Beyond conceptual considerations, the answer to this must
take into account the nature of the learners, how the

concepts are applied, and how this serves the critical
short and long term educational needs of the particular

learning group.

CHAPTER
PEDAGOGY OF BEHAVIORISM:

I

V

LIMITATIONS

FOR EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN

When the conceptual foundations of behaviorism are

translated into modes of education and training there are
a range of issues that emerge pertaining to any learner.

Emotionally disturbed children, however, have particular
constellations of characteristics and needs which set them
apart from more normal populations of learners.

For

purposes of this study, an assessment of the pedagogical

implications of a behaviorist approach must focus on its

appropriateness for this particular group.
Consequently, the initial task of this chapter is to

summarize some of the major learning characteristics and

problems of emotionally disturbed children that must be

considered in any pedagogical strategy designed to meet
their short and long term needs.

Then, after examining

the pedagogical implications of behaviorism in general,
the problems of this approach for serving the needs of
the emotionally disturbed will be discussed.

Specific

attention is given to the way behaviorist pedagogy deals

with emotional conflict, autonomy, error and active
exploration.

Finally, learning needs unmet by the
65
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behaviorist approach will be identified.
Learning Characteristics of Emotionally
Disturbed Children
Emotional disturbance is a complex notion; its

meaning is evasive, ambiguous and multifaceted.
(1978)

Shea

observes that there are as many definitions of the

term as there are writers and researchers who address the
subject.

These definitions vary according to discipline,

ideological perspective and the audience for which they
were designed.
Most would agree, however, that disturbed children

typically present an extreme mixture of intellectual,
social and emotional levels of development

—a

condition

which produces difficulties for both diagnosis and
prescriptive educational planning.

Their perception of

the world is often disoriented, vague and confused.

Most

reveal a totally inadequate comprehension of space, size,
shape and sequence, and are unable to cope successfully

with the symbols, concepts and abstractions of language
and learning (Fenichel, 1969; Hewett, 1968)

There is a connection between the personality
statement
characteristics described in the introductory
described here that
of this study and the characteristics

patterns and
pertain more specifically to learning
emotional disturbance
problems. As with the definition of
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itself, a portrayal of the learning characteristics or

problems of disturbed children is influenced by the ideological or disciplinary perspective taken as a reference

Since this study is concerned with behaviorist and

point.

constructivist perspectives, characteristics will be viewed
through these lenses.
Perspectives on Emotional Disturbance
Behaviorist theory as applied to emotional

disturbance treats the environmental variables that may
be manipulated and altered to eliminate the unacceptable

behavior.

The basic premise is that this maladaptive

behavior was originally learned in response to environ-

mental reward of some kind and is equally amenable to
"unlearning" if appropriate reinforcement and motivation
are provided.

Therefore the behaviorist, in determining the extent
and nature of disturbance in a child, looks to the

environment.

He seeks the locus of the condition in the

discrete environments in which the child is functioning,
to the
not within an internal state or process belonging

child.

Thus behaviorists such as Ullman and Krasner (1965)

behavior to
find the significance attributed to a given
They define maladaptive
be dependent on the social context.
up in the
behavior as not fitting the expectations set
actually present,
context, not responding to all the stimuli
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and not obtaining typical or maximum forms of reinforcement

available to the status of behavior.
Skinner sees the community functioning as
forcing agent for the maladaptive behaviors:

a rein-

alter the

environmental system of rewards and punishments, and thereby
alter the behavior itself.

Thus, there is no need within

his system to delve into the nature of emotional distur-

There are simply practical problems connected with

bance.

certain behaviors which can be modified through appropriate

alteration of their environmental impact.
In Skinner's view, maladaptive behavior is controlled

by the consequences of that behavior.

Deviant behaviors

are assumed to have been learned in response to inadequate
or inappropriate reinforcement.

Such behavior is considered

disadvantageous to the individual and/or the group.

If the

more "advantageous" behaviors can begin to be rewarded in
the form of positive consequences following in the environ-

ment and if those pairings are repeated often, then there

will exist a behavior-environment exchange circuit which,
individual
as a result, becomes characteristic of the

emitting the new behavior.
Behaviorists stress the modification of maladaptive
of success
behavior in order to increase the probability
of the individual
in, and acceptance by, the environment

child.

underlying core or
In accomplishing this task, the
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causal factors are ignored, as is the concern that the

modification and symptom- removal may only mask the real
problem.

One way in which Skinner ignores causal aspects of

behavior is through his notion of measuring frequency of
a

given behavior and using the data descriptively.

A

disturbed child's behaviors, according to this view, may
be less bizarre as a whole if they occur less frequently.

The focus, then, is on a reduction of occurrences of

maladaptive behavior and an increase in alternative,
desired behavior.

As a result, he bypasses inner causes

and emphasizes more normal "appearance."
In summary, the behaviorist perspective on an

emotionally disturbed child's disorder is viewed only in
terms of observable characteristics and is interpreted as

being learned from the environment.

The maladaptive

learning is derived from the environmental context and its

importance is assessed in terms of the frequency with

which it occurs.
Constructivists, particularly researchers at the
Piaget Institute, view development

— and

by extension

phenomenon
emotional disturbance— as a tightly integrated

with emotional and cognitive aspects.

They maintain that

that the two
each aspect is dependent on the other and
"The emotional
areas must be understood synergistically
.

.
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and intellectual aspects of development cannot be

dissociated, and a study of the dynamics of cognitive

function finds its necessary counterpart in a study of
the dynamics of emotional development"
p.

227)

(Inhelder, 1976,

.

In addition to the bond between emotional and

cognitive areas of development, Piagetians suggest that
social factors too are intertwined.

"The affective and

social development of the child follows the same general
process [as the cognitive development] since affective,

social and cognitive aspects of behavior are in fact
inseparable"

(Piaget and Inhelder, 1976, p. 33).

There is also a connection between psychomotor and

emotional areas of development, as suggested by Wyne and
O'Connor:

"A developmental view of emotional disturbance

requires that the cognitive and psychomotor domains be

given appropriate attention in any attempt to understand

deviations in the affective domain"

(1979, p.

323)

There is, then, in the constructivist view of

emotional disturbance, an attempt to structure that view
affective,
in a wholistic fashion, to incorporate cognitive,

development.
social and psychomotor aspects of the child's

multi-dimensional
The constructivist frame of reference is a
the
perspective, based on an integrated approach to

functional problems of disturbed children.
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Since the Skinnerian view of emotional disturbance

affords no specific explanatory or descriptive picture of
the children other than in relation to the environmental

contingencies producing the maladaptive behavior, the
learning characteristics and problems of the emotionally

disturbed child that follow are essentially derived from
the constructivist perspective.

Static Modes of Thinking and Learning

Emotionally disturbed children characteristically

display strong tendencies toward static connections with
the objects of knowledge in their worlds.

They experience

difficulty in developing operative and transformational
schemes and prefer to cling to a developmental ly regressed,

static and figurative functioning.

This extends further

into a pronounced inability to expand their focus from

present observations to an active establishment of connections with schemes from earlier experience or to make

predictions about future outcomes.

Anticipation or

prediction is difficult as is the representation of
spatial transformations.
One aspect of this static functioning is the
of
inordinate attention to detail which is typical

disturbed children.

They tend to ignore any general

exclusively
patterns or configurations, and focus almost
irrelevant to the task
on minute details which are often

.
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at hand.

Hence there is a general aversion to transformational
aspects of their environment in favor of the static
elements.

"These children resisted making inferences from

their own actions, but expected to find their answers in
the empirical aspects of the objects, if only they could

perceive them accurately!"

(Reid, 1978, p. 7).

Their

tendency is to reexamine, insistently and forcefully, the
static elements of a learning situation even though this

material has proven insufficient to gain the information
or outcome sought

These children cannot seem to manage the coordination
of actions necessary for logical structuring of thought.
Instead, each action seems to contain its own separate and

isolated causality (Schmid-Kitsikis

,

1976;

Reid, 1978a),

without lending any support to the construction of

a

generalization or inference that would lead to logical
structuring.

Thus they seek out fragments and bring an

atomistic intuition to bear on the task at hand.
This extreme limitation of abilities to transfer
schemes from one situation to another, to generalize,
abstract and draw inferences
observers.

Cowan (1978)

,

has been noted by many

further observed a tendency to

children
cling to past events with a ritualistic fervor;
may or may not
often mechanically repeated patterns which

.
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have been appropriate in a previous context but were no
longer relevant in a new context.

Research done by Inhelder (1976) has indicated
significant problems for disturbed children in dealing with

probabilistic reasoning of any kind.

They cannot seem to

accept or meaningfully process chance phenomena and random
Instead, they tend to impart highly subjective

events.

rationales to explain such random occurence as, for
example, the chance patterns in rolling dice or calling
out bingo letters.

The children are likely to manipulate

their interpretation of chance data in order to infuse it

with some

predictability of their own rigid sort.

The general dominance of static schemes, and thinking
patterns related to them, is seen by Cowan (1978) as the
basic element of their cognitive functioning which is

responsible for ensuing difficulties with object permanence, symbol-referent differentiation, conservation and

perspect ive-taking

Assimilation- Accommodation Imbalance

Although all children demonstrate some degree of
imbalance in their assimilation-accommodation continuum,
to be
disturbed children's imbalances have been observed
more pervamore extreme, fluctuate more quickly, occure

sively, and last developmentally longer.

"The severely

egocentric
emotionally disturbed exhibit eratic and

.

.
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behaviors.

They tend to assimilate the world to their own

subjective needs rather than to attempt to adapt to reality
and thereby resist accommodation of assimilative schemes"
(Reid, 1978a)

Voyat (1978) concluded that the consequence of such

assimilation-accommodation imbalance is a cognitive organization without regard for external adaptation.

Such faulty

organization results in an equilibrium not simply regressed
in a disturbed child, but one that is structurally different

from the normal child.

Disturbed children are frequently described as being
lost in fantasy, out of touch with reality, obsessively
or ritualistic ally preoccupied with a limited range and

interpretation of objects and events.
tive phrases suggest an

pathology.

All of these descrip-

overassimilative aspect to their

The children seem to twist and turn the world,

insisting that it conform to their own inner needs and

interpretations
There are overaccommodative aspects to their

pathology as well.

They often react to environmental

stimulation in highly distractible and imitative ways.
lacking an
They may merge with surrounding personalities,

awareness of personal identity and sense of self.

their

in
This pattern of inconsistency and fluctuation
assimilative-accommodative approaches to the world

.

.
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is characteristic of the functional imbalance of emotionally

disturbed children.

Their social, emotional and intellec-

tual functional discrepancies are concommitant with
imbalances between figurative and operative functioning,

indicating the intricate bond between functional and
structural aspects of development (Cowan, 1978; Reid, 1978a,
1978b)

This connection is corroborated in research data

coming from Piaget's Institute in Geneva which describes
"permanent or at least very long lasting assimilation-

accommodation imbalances [in disturbed children] with
resulting imbalance in figurative and operative functions"
(Cowan, 1978, p.

337)

This Genevan research further

suggests that the difficulties demonstrated with object-

permanance, symbol-referent differentiation and perspective-

taking can be connected with the characteristic dominance
of static schemes, as described above.

Avoidance Patterns
These children develop intricate and often bizarre

avoidance and withdrawal mechanisms to escape encounters
their
with physical reality as well as with individuals in

environment.

The theme of avoidance is a pervasive one in

activity and
their functional profile; it dominates their
It is most
apparently their thought processes as well.
to encounter
clearly discernable in their reluctance
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cognitive conflict.
Schmid-Kitsikis (1976) found it impossible to center
or focus disturbed children on the contradictions evident
in the activities in which they were engaged.

They might

distort what they see, invent "tall tales" to cover the

contradiction or anthropomorphize an inanimate object to
explain some feature of the contradiction.

These reactions,

coupled with digressions and refusals suggest that they
need to dominate the experienced conflict in order to avoid
its impact on them, rather than acknowledge the conflict

and incorporate it into their subsequent strategy-building.

There is often an actual task-distortion on the part
of disturbed children designed presumably to avoid the

conceptual-perceptual conflict which might be deliberately
built into an educational presentation, and presumably to
avoid resulting anxiety.

Schmid-Kitsikis (1976, p. 247)

gives an illustrative example.

When one of two equal balls

of clay is changed into a sausage shape and a question

posed as to equality of quantity, these children tended

toward a single similar response:

most claimed to be

unable to answer unless the two lumps of clay remain the
same.

A typical statement was "You can't know before

they're the same."
These children exhibit tendencies to repeatedly
is put
change answers quickly when a problem or question

77

to them and to contradict themselves with successive

responses.

This pattern is quite different from normal

children who might change responses over the course of a
learning experience, absorbing the new possibilities

demonstrated in the material or in peer responses, and
being aware of successive answers as possible corrections.

Disturbed children display no apparent awareness of
the inconsistency nor do they reconstruct answers based on

new data or changes in peer's positions.

In the experiment

referred to above, Schmid-Kitsikis (1976, p. 246) describes
such an incident:

when a disturbed child was confronted

with two equal quantities of clay, one of which was transformed as he watched, into a sausage shape, he responded,
"Here there is more, and there, there is more."

The child

could not be urged to experience any cognitive discomfort

with his responses.
The avoidance of conflict often is displayed in such

failure even to recognize the existence of the conflict.
self
The children may give fluctuating, inconsistent and
of that
contradictory responses with no apparent awareness

or researcher.
aspect even when it is raised by the teacher
learning
Avoidance, then, is a dominant theme in the

profiles of disturbed children.

They become adept at

interpretations of
tactics which avoid subjecting their
disequilibrating trials and
the world to the potentially

.
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tests of experience.

Cowan (1978, p. 341) maintains that

"ultimately, whatever the motivation, continued avoidance
of disequilibrating situations almost inevitably results
in structural retardation and further functional imbalance."

Symbol-referent Confusion
Symbolic function presents difficulties for most

disturbed children.

They are confused by the use of

symbols to indicate reality and take the symbols themselves
as some form of reality.

For example, the word "snake"

written on a piece of paper could terrify such a child.
Anthony (1965) gives other examples of this tendency

which illustrate that signs, semiotics and language are
often assumed to possess the same degree of reality as the
objects represented by these pictures or words.

Another

dimension of this confusion is that desires, images or
dreams are typically not distuinguished from deeds and

actions
This symbol— ref erent confusion can occur in children
standard
who are extremely bright and can give certain

indications of a high level intelligence.
(1976, p. 247)

Schmid-Kitsikis

describes a twelve year old disturbed boy

characteristic of
who demonstrated a definitional response
"knife," citing many funca fifteen year old to the word
aspects, after which he
tional uses as well as descriptive
fear at pronouncing the
fell to the floor proclaiming his

.
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word
Egocentric Perspective
Because these children demonstrate a lack of

differentiation between self and other, between self and
external world, they remain at a developmentally delayed
egocentric level of functioning.

This affects their

social, emotional and cognitive areas of functioning.

This aspect will be examined more closely at the end of

this chapter, in the section on autonomy which is affected
as a result of this egocentric perspective.

Impulsivity

Despite individual differences, emotionally disturbed
children often exhibit a similar learning problem of being
unable to delay response or inhibit an immediate reaction
in order to scan memory and experience for possible help

in making choices and decisions.

There seems to be an urgency in their response
pattern.

To postpone closure is evidently uncomfortable

for these children; perhaps an immediate answer avoids the

anxiety connected with the risk of trying and the spectre
of possible failure even though it almost ensures an

incorrect, hasty answer.

Impulsivity characterizes their reactions to interpersonal contact and contact with the physical environment
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as well.

Their inability to delay, to analyze and to

reflect accounts for many of the difficulties disturbed

children encounter in an educational setting.
It is apparent from the preceding account of learning

characteristics and problems that cognitive, affective,
social and psychomotor domains are intensely interactive
and that the source of the formulation or distortion of

perceptions and behavior relevant to learning is found

within the child as much as in the environment.

It is also

evident that these characteristics and problems of disturbed

children are more deep seated, extreme and intricately
linked than with normal children; hence it is even more

important with disturbed children for an educational

approach to consider tendencies, learning characteristics,
and predispositions as well as outer states and to focus

on the interplay between the cognitive, affective and

other domains.
An additional complexity of educational significance
is that these children are not simply cases of regressed

development but, as seen in the example of the boy reacting
to the word "knife," may be normal or advanced in some

areas of intellectual development.
an uneven academic profile.

They typically exhibit

On the one hand, they may be

advanced in certain academic areas; on the other their
intense confusions and distortions subvert their functional
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level.

This characteristic discrepancy is often revealed

in the occurrence of lower level performance on Piagetian

tasks than on standard I.Q. measures.

These children have

often acquired precociously or age-appropriately certain

information and skills, but that material is then
processed, combined and transformed by lower level cogni-

tive structures (Reid, 1978a; Safford, 1978).

Behavior Modification in Education of
Emotionally Disturbed Children

Background
Although there were scattered attempts to apply

Watsonian and Pavlovian concepts of behavior modification
as early as the turn of the century, it was not until the

1960s that this perspective took the educational field by

storm.

It was essentially the Skinnerian model which

exerted great influence throughout the field generally and

with specific reference to the subsequently developing
sub-field of special education.
ly disturbed children,

For educators of emotional-

it was considered a productive and

psychoanalytic
efficient change from the then influential
approach.

This approach was seen as being diametrically

many educators
opposed to that psychodynamic model which
required more
felt was imprecise and time-consuming,
could demonstrate,
technical proficiency than most teachers
change in the children.
and afforded only minimal observable

.
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Thus, the field was readily receptive to an efficient,

effective, practical model that required little clinical,
or therapeutic, training of educators.

Indeed, the training

required of teachers was more educationally grounded; it
required becoming familiar with learning theory, developing
an understanding of how reinforcement works, how reinforcers

are selected, how to measure frequency and how to set up

programs
The earlier influence of a psychoanalytic approach

emphasized the search for inner causes

—a

task which

exacted inappropriate demands of educators.

Here, too,

behaviorism provided an immediately effective frame of
reference independent of inner causes, focusing on accessible, observable, overt behavior

—a

much more manageable

task for teachers.
It is easy to understand, then, the appeal of a

system focusing on specific behaviors, immediate feedback,
and more rapidly evolving modification of a given maladap-

tive behavior.

Essentially, a more rigid and complex

system of thought with regard to educating emotionally
supplanted
disturbed children led to and was significantly
of behavior
by the simpler, direct, more manageable system

modification.
and inadThe psychoeducational approach ironically

methodology
vertantly paved the way for a behaviorist
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which would achieve the goal of supplying an external
framework of stability prescribed by the advocates of

a

psychoanalytic approach (Safford, 1978; Wyne and O'Connor,
1979; Hewett, 1974) to counter the children's loosely

organized personal structures.
(1969)

As described by Fenichel

the children were seen to be disorganized, needing

someone to organize their world for them, to protect them
against their fear of losing control, to help them resist

their impulses.

The psychoanalytic group advocated an

educational approach in which the teacher would be the
center of a highly directed, tightly organized setting

designed to apply from without a system of order and
stability upon the children's chaos and disorganization.
Behavior modification advocates continued to place the

teacher at the center of curriculum and reinforcement but
rejected all notions of inner needs or causes.
General Introduction

Behavior modification can be viewed at its most basic
or
level as a form of teaching by means of extrinsic

external reinforcement.

It is the functional, educational

-that focuses
application of a learning theory— behavior ism-

"mental" or intraon overt behavior and de-emphasizes
field of education
psychic events. It functions within the
and is considered the
as a kind of behavioral engineering

name of empiricism,
practical outgrowth a "a crusade in the
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materialism or mechanism" (Scriven, 1973,

p.

422).

It is a process in which target behaviors are deter-

mined, usually by the teacher, delineated in terms of

observable behavior, and based on a systematic application
of the learning theory derived from experimental research.

The successive approximations of the target behavior

already occurring are rewarded, responses not approximating
that desired behavior are ignored, punished or negatively

Behavior modification is, then, a systematic

reinforced.

arrangement of environmental events organized to produce
a specific desired change in observable behavior

(Swanson,

1979; Haring and Phillips, 1972).

A behavior modification program designed for

emotionally disturbed children is based on the following
assumptions

;

that maladaptive behavior is the problem,

not a superficial representation of the problem, and that

because a maladaptive behavior is a function of its

consequences in the environment, it can be altered by

modifying the consequences currently acting as reinforcing
agents

.

It presupposes planned observation and measurement

in order to accomplish this.

many of
It is important to note at the outset that

modification
the following criticisms applied to behavior
particular appliprograms are valid only with regard to
a shortIn those cases, it is not necessarily
cations.

.
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coming of the behavioral principles which underlie the
program, but possibly a faulty interpretation of those

Skinnerian principles or a badly planned program.
However, the overwhelming majority of all programs

or descriptions of approaches examined in this study

possessed some or all of these critical flaws (Andrews,
1970; Baer et al, 1973; Bijou and Baer, 1961; Breger, 1969;

Buckholdt and Gubrium, 1980; Catania and Brigham, 1978;
Chadwick, 1971; Fagan, 1975; Forness and Macmillan, 1972;

Hammill and Bartel, 1975; Hanley, 1970; Haring, 1972, 1974;
Harshman, 1969; Hewett, 1974; Hewet et al., 1969; Hilts,
1974; Honig and Staddon, 1977; Hughes, 1980; Kamii, 1971,

1979;

Krumbolz, J. and Krumboltz, H., 1972; Mackenzie,

1977; Madden, 1972; Mann and Phillips, 1971; Miller and

Dyer, 1975; Morreau and Daley, 1972; Poteet, 1973; Ramp and

Hopkins, 1971; Safford, 1978; Shea, 1978; Skinner, 1968,
1973; Ullman and Krasner, 1975; Wedell, 1975; Wyne and

O'Connor, 1979)

.

And this remained the case despite

attempts by the writer to discover any program descriptions
these
or behavior modification approaches that would avoid

criticisms
of
It is the contention of the writer that because

conclusions
the huge number of cases in point, drawing

modification
about the educational application of behavior
being mindful
techniques is valid and worth stating while

.
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of the above mentioned caveat

— i.e.,

that some of these

criticisms do not necessarily follow from Skinnerian

principles
The application of Skinnerian principles to

educational settings for disturbed children proceeds
exactly as it would in other settings.

Emitted behavior

of the organism is seen as acting upon the environment,

with consequences ensuing, giving feedback to the organism.
In the case of deviant behavior, Skinner maintains that

there is some kind of positive feedback engaging the
children, increasing the probability that such behavior

will recur.
Those in his immediate environment may not be aware
that they have participated in reinforcing the child's

maladaptive behavior, but the reinforcing elements must
be identified and the environmental system of rewards and

punishments altered in ways specifically designed to alter
the behavior.

Sequentially, the modification process

proceeds as follows:

First, the maladaptive behavior is

measured
explicitly identified, described and its frequency
and recorded.

According to Haring and Phillips (1974)

,

in

for modifying,
order to qualify as an appropriate behavior

observable terms, have
the behavior should be couched in
and be repeatable.
a definite beginning and end,

Next

,

of that behavior
a baseline for the occurrence

.
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is determined, derived from current frequency of occurrence.

This is followed by a careful analysis of the reinforcers
in the environment and their relevance to the behavior in

question.

Often with disturbed children the reinforcers

considered are based on Premack's (1965) notion of

determining a high probability behavior that is naturally
occurring, e.g., enjoying recess, and using that to

encourage a low probability, but desired behavior, e.g.,
staying in their seats during work time.

Teachers must be astute in their observations of any

approximation of the desired target behavior.

This is

particularly true with disturbed children whose behaviors

may only slightly and infrequently approach the desired
behavior.

These approximations must be noticed and rein-

forced, according to the plan constructed, with the inten-

tion of gradually shaping the behavior toward less

disruptive, undesirable or maladaptive behavior.

For

disturbed children the process may be very gradual indeed
from the
and much patience and attentiveness is required

teacher

According to Skinner, "behavior, even when it is
direction one wishes
highly complex, may be shaped in any
successive approximations
by differential reinforcement of
to the desired operant"

(Langer, 1969, p. 62).

relevance of
This paradigm ignores the power or
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causal factors in deviance, and deals only with the

behavioral manifestations

— which

are not viewed as the

signifiers of the problems, but as the problems themselves.

Behaviorists pursue a course designed to discover
the modifying environmental conditions, analyze relation-

ships between environment and observable behavior and

account for the changes in those behaviors.
This technology does not require any acquaintance

with esoteric theories or understanding of the symbolic
meaning of behavior or knowledge of psychopathology.
Instead it places the emphasis firmly upon the individual

maladaptive behavior as a function of circumstances in the
environment.

It is a course of action intended to be

applicable to both individuals and groups; to be appropriate
funcfor affective, psychosocial and cognitive aspects of
a
tioning; to be easily utilized by personnel with only
a
moderate amount of training; and to be applicable in

variety of settings.
Critiques of Behavior Modification
influential
This approach, while it has been highly

subject of critical
and pervasively practiced, is the

directed at a
assessments from a variety of sources,
procedures.
number of its specific policies and

Some of

following section, both in
these will be examined in the
particular reference to
their general application and with
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the education of emotionally disturbed children.
no question

,

There is

even by its staunchest critics, that the

behavior modification paradigm has been extremely useful
in the education of disturbed children.

It is the conten-

tion of this study, however, that the approach is limited
in scope, inadequate in promoting more complex thinking,

and unable to develop self-determined learning or signifi-

cant transfer of learning.

Related to Motivation

.

The behaviorist position with

regard to motivation is that it is not a useful or meaningful concept.

In its place is a highly complex system of

reinforcement designed to explain the shaping of behavior
from external reward and punishment, or, phrased in another
way, from the consequences arising in the environment as
a

result of that behavior.
This rejection of motivational aspects of human

behavior has prompted much criticism.
The most persistent complaint against behaviorism
is that it fails to recognize the rational and
intentional element of human behavior [and]
neglects what some consider to be the most
important psychological determinant of all;
that is motivation (Robinson, 1976, p. 400).
In his attempt to excise the concept of intrinsic

motivation from his technique, Skinner is left with a
appears to
resulting inability to account for data that

understanding a
be extremely relevant in deciphering and
given behavior.

Other critics have voiced the same
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objection:

the behaviorist view of motivation is limited

in scope and inadequate to the task of accounting for all

human behavior (MacMillan and Forness, 1970a).
Examples of stimulation seeking behavior are not
neatly, if at all, explained in the behavior modification
approach.

Festinger (1957)

,

for example, stipulates that

when incoming stimulation differs from existing perceptions
or conceptions, motivation to resolve the discrepancy

follows.

This is certainly an intrinsic form of motivation,

not accounted for in the behaviorist technique and, according to Festinger, this cognitive incongruity quite commonly
acts as a primary motivational source.

Behavior theory cannot adequately account for
children's seeking mastery without any observable or extrinsic reinforcement present.

This includes such behavior as

a baby's attempts at self-feeding when being fed would

surely produce greater immediate reward.

White (1965)

views this as a significant consideration, one which

behavior modification technique cannot encompass.

As a

result, that paradigm is weakened in its attempt to view

motivation as simply extrinsic and observable when significant exceptions occur.
One is unable to observe the consequences for
behaviors that result from exploration, cognicuriosity, and competence as
tive dissonance,
motives. Yet, these sources of motivation must
to
not be ignored or discounted as one attempts

.
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reach the atypical child (MacMillan and Forness,
1970a)

In fact, disturbed children who tend toward inordinate

dependence on authority, have an even greater need than
normal children to develop more independent, intrinsic

motivations in striving for competence.
The behaviorist

'

s

rejoinder to this criticism is

couched in asking what is added to the publicly observable

connection between response and reinforcer when the notion
of motivation is supplied?

The answer is formulated in

terms of all the exceptions that exist and of all the data
for which a behaviorist account does not suffice.

An interesting issue raised by MacMillan and Forness
(1970a)

is whether the behaviorist emphasis on extrinsic

motivation in the form of rewards from the environment
impedes the internalized self-rewarding or self-correcting

response found to be operative in effective problem-solvers.
This self-induced response has been described by Jensen
(1968)

as most often covert, especially in adults, and

consists of implicitly saying "that's right" or "that's

wrong" in a self-corrective mode.

This feature of effective

points
problem-solving behavior is not the same, the author

unrelated reinout, as external versions, nor do other
settings function
forcers typically applied in behaviorist
in the same way.

The question MacMillan and Forness raise,

of developing this
then, is do behaviorists deprive a child

,
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internal monitoring device and hinder his problem-solving
ability in their use of extrinsic motivation?
The behaviorists

'

defense against this criticism

directed at extrinsic motivation is articulated in the
notion of fading out the external rewards gradually so
that behavior is then presumed to occur without benefit of

such externality.

"But the child often doesn't make this

shift to independent learning"

(Forman and Kuschner, 1977).

The point is made also by other researchers in critical

appraisal of this crucial aspect of the behavior modification paradigm (Reid, 1978a, 1978b, 1979; Schmid-Kitsikis
1973, 1976)

.

Of the many studies advocating extrinsic reinforcement
(e.g., Broden, Hall, Dunlap and Clark, 1970; O'Leary and

Becker, 1967)

,

None appears to have demonstrated control of
behavior by a) an extrinsic reinforcement system,
b) fading the extrinsic system while employing
a self-management program based on an intrinsic
reinforcement system, and c) maintaining the
self-managed behavior over time and across
settings. Moreover, programs which are designed
to change behavior without a provision for
permanent maintenance are of little use and may
in fact be ethically suspect (Wehman, Abramson
and Norman, 1977)
.

This raises the related issue of arbitrary vs.
distinguishnatural reinforcers and the general problem of
for maintening between reinforcement for acquisition and
ance of a given behavior.

Much of the reinforcement used
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in educational settings is of the arbitrary kind

(Ferster,

1966; Chadwick and Day, 1971; Haring and Phillips, 1972).

Teachers are encouraged to set up such reinforcers, e.g.,
check-marks, tokens, food, etc.

Ferster (1966) points out

that performances so reinforced are narrowly specified and
do not tend to lead to integrated general learning.

The

fact that there is no functional connection between the

arbitrary reinforcer and the target behavior is important
here.

Furthermore, "it should be noted that while behavior

is acquired and strengthened under frequent reinforcement,

it is also more easily extinguished whenever the rein-

forcement is removed or greatly reduced"
and Norman, 1977)

.

(Wehman, Abramson

It is, therefore, questionable whether

behavior modifiers are actually making this transition to

naturally occurring reinforcers.
Scriven (1973, p. 425), too, addresses the issue of

performance maintenance in his criticism of the behaviorist
approach:

"Behavior modification in general has not gone

after maintaining performance without external reinforcers.
is usually
Since such maintenance is at least part of what

programs
meant by learning, its absence in the applied

based on this approach is a significant failing.
since
This is admittedly a problem of application

natural reinforcers
teachers can develop greater emphasis on
Yet this is often not the
if they select and plan well.

.

.
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case.

MacMillan and Forness (1970a) suggest the

pervasiveness of this practice and express concern over
its occurrence:

Teachers employing the behavior modification
strategy, as they interpret it, have had their
children on check marks for an entire year.
When asked the reason the children were still
functioning at this low level, the teacher
indicated, 'I'm not about to change something
This teacher has failed in
that is working 1'
her responsibility to bring the child's
behavior under the control of reinforcers
that will exist in the child's natural
environment
Wehman, Abramson and Norman (1979, p. 229), in an

extensive review of the behaviorist literature on external

reinforcement issues, suggest that problems exist in
changing to natural reinforcers.
Fading reinforcement contingencies will not be
sufficent to maintain newly developed behavior
patterns unless the responses come under control
of other powerful reinforcers which correspond
Perhaps
to natural environmental conditions.
behavioral programmers must revise their
approach to program development.
Because the child often does not make the shift to

independent learning from being extrinsically motivated as
paradigm,
it is described in the behavior modification

it

procedure
would seem more advisable to use an educational
thereby obviate
that seldom uses external reinforcement and
out
the problem of having to fade the reinforcement

(Forman and Kushner, 1977, p. 105)

Another problematic element of this external.

.
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typically positive reinforcement is that it is possibly
received by disturbed children as the other side of a
judgmental coin.

The recipient of such positive reward

may become anxious, realizing that although he received
praise or reward this time, an inordinate pressure may be

experienced to keep up the good work or face feelings of
unworthiness.

For these children, then, positive rein-

forcement holds within it an attenuated negative criticism.
Related to Complex Thought

.

The behavior modification

approach maintains that learning is essentailly learning
when to do what with prescriptions for how to accomplish
tasks designed in small incremental steps.

Yet "the usual

learning situation is much more complex than is suggested
by the behaviorist paradigm

.

.

.

The analysis of human

learning in terms of discrete operational steps may ignore
or violate the inherent logic in the material to be learned"

(MacMillan and Forness, 1970a, p. 293)

According to many critics, this approach also violates
the complexity of the learner and of the interactive

elements that are in a more dynamic relationship to each
and
other than the behaviorists would acknowledge (Forman

Kuschner, 1977; Furth and Wachs, 1975; Inhelder, 1976;

Mann and Phillips, 1971).
studies
Reid (1978) reports that the findings of
that
within special education refute the assumption

96

disturbed children learn best through the behavior modification orientation which specifies learning through
associations typically fostered by repeated exercise and
drill.

This prevalent practice of focusing on the more
limited, perceptual aspects of thought (Blatt and Garfunkel,
1973) does not do justice to the more complex functions

such as generalizing, predicting, analyzing, evaluating and
inferring.

The behavior modification paradigm ignores the

interplay between empirical observation or absorption of

perceptual data and the process of reflexive abstraction
in which the perceptual information is used in a more

generalized fashion leading to logical thinking abilitites.

Criticism is directed also at the incremental units
into which a behaviorist curriculum is organized (Forman
and Kuschner, 1977; Reid, 1978b; Schmid-Kitsikis

,

1976).

learning
It is suggested that except in the most simplistic

situations, the children themselves should discover how to

break down a task into small steps.

Instead of fractional-

into
izing the curricular task (Mann and Phillips, 1967)

would be
isolated components, a more successful approach
elicits the
to develop an easier whole task, one which
can manage and
highest level of thought process the child
meaning appropriate to
one which has an entire contextual
his level of understanding.
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The fragmented aspects of the disturbed child's

intellectual apparatus requires not the fractionalized

approach (Mann and Phillips, 1967) current in educational
programs designed for him, but the presentation of learning
tasks which emphasize the relation between dimensions.
It is difficult at best for this behaviorist approach

to foster the more complex aspects of thought while often

emphasizing immediate reinforcement, empirical observation,
simple perceptions of events, and incremental steps in
learning.

In fact it is criticized for its emphasis of

the perceptual by those who view perception itself to be

guided by the structures of thought already formed.

According to Inhelder and Karmilof f-Smith (1976)

,

what

children actually observe in the empirical world is guided
by their theories of what they should be seeing.

This strategy also fails to encourage the kind of

frustration tolerance that makes reflective thought

attractive (Carpenter, 1974)

:

Given the practical inter-

pretation of Skinnerian principles occurring within most
classes for disturbed children, it appears unlikely that

those precepts which theoretically could be employed to
reinforce more reflective thinking are forthcoming.
not
Instead, the classroom milieu for these children is

processes
seen to be hospitable to reflective thought
(Reid,

1978b, Voyat

,

1978;

Schmid-Kitsikis

,

1976).
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Related to Problem-solving and Invention.
The ability to reason, think abstractly and
solve complex problems cannot develop as long
as the child functions preoperationally that
is, as long as the child's thoughts are
dominated by perceived events in the immediate
present (Wyne and O'Conner, 1979, p. 119).

—

Abstract thinking and creative problem-solving, then,
require experience with conceptual thinking and the inte-

gration or synthesis of concepts.

These complex forms of

thought are fostered through the experience and practice
of viewing objects, events and ideas in terms of relational

aspects or causal connections.

Inventive thought also

requires such practice in applying the integrative elements

between objects, events or ideas.

The behaviorist approach

neither explains these adequately nor encourages their

occurrence in the classroom.
Successful invention usually expands freedom of
action or range of influence and it is pursued
even when it is not clear just what advantages
Invention often leads to new
will ensue.
of which can be clearly predicted
some
problems,
process. But it is often
inventive
the
during
it may create more
though
even
rewarding
than it solves
conditions
aversive
and
problems
138).
p.
1974,
(Carpenter,
alleviates
or

Behaviorist-oriented pedagogy does not by definition
or of necessity eliminate mediational or problem-solving

strategies to enhance the effectiveness of learning, but
on
in its practical applications does not seem to focus

this aspect.

Moreover, its reinforcement policies lend

themselves to fostering small incremental changes,
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primarily in given perceptual tasks or rote learning even
though this too is not necessarily so as derived from

Skinnerian principles.
This criticism hinges on distinguishing between two
kinds of experience.

Behaviorists assume there is only

physical experience in which information is drawn from the
objects themselves.

The more abstract form of thought

referred to above is based on a form of logical thought,

drawn not simply from the object itself but from the child's
actions and the coordination of those actions, i.e., the

operations and transformations brought to bear on those
objects.
If the primary emphasis in a behaviorist approach is

on physical experience, the child does not have sufficient

opportunity for developing this ability to abstract or
utilize logical forms of thought.

Such programs fail, then,

to provide significant experiences which might promote an

awareness on the part of disturbed children of complex

relations and abstractions (Forman and Hill, 1980).

Related to Transfer of Learning

.

As viewed by

transfer is
cr itics, part of the problem of learning
the criteria
embedded in the definition of learning and
inadequate the
used to measure it. The critics consider
new information
behaviorist objective of teaching the child
the skills required
in each instance while not fostering
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to acquire new information himself or to restructure the

information in a personally significant framework.

The

notion of learning, then, is too narrow, the criteria
too specific in the behaviorist approach.

"The behaviorist

typically does not focus on information processing but,
instead, on the overt behavior, the performance"
and Kuschner, 1977, p. 99).

(Forman

Thus there is a failure to

see that learning involves discovering what information
is necessary and then applying it to the problem.

The behavioristic approach has the disadvantage of
a high rate of false positives--that is, assuming that

learning has occurred, when in fact it has not (Kamii and
Derman, 1971; Forman and Kuschner, 1977).

Kamii and

Derman demonstrated the superficial effects of Englemann's

behavior modification approach.

Engleman attempted to

teach a particular task and according to his standards
and his post-test, he was satisfied that the children had

learned the task.

Kamii and Derman then administered a

post-test requiring the transfer of that very same material
to another similar situation, a task which the children

totally failed to accomplish.

It would appear that what

was accepted by this behavior modifier as learning qualified

more as an evidence of rote performance.

The children had

not learned in any meaningful sense of that term.

Critics of the behaviorist approach admit that it is
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often important to look for the occurrence of some

specified behavioral criterion in determining if learning
has occurred (Forman and Kuschner, 1977).

However, this

may be a necessary condition but not always sufficient.
Nor can the occurrence of the behavioral criterion auto-

matically signal that learning has occurred.

If the

learning criterion is too product-oriented and based only
on a single instance, learning may only appear to have
If the learning does not obtain in a situation

occurred.

of transfer, then it is not a meaningful statement to

call it learning.

Related to Transmission of Knowledge Model and

Passivity

.

In a behaviorist orientation, the emphasis in

learning is on the human capacity to transmit information.
Kamii and DeVries (1977) have shown that the construction
of the typical objectives in behaviorist-oriented special

education programs is based on the notion that knowledge
is transmitted from the environment, usually through the

teacher.

Their research has demonstrated that such

transmission is not a sufficient condition for learning.

Acquisition of knowledge depends on a more complex inte
gration of factors than the behaviorist pedagogy allows.
Part of the problem raised regarding the transmissionpart
of-knowledge model is concommitant passivity on the
Reid (1978) speculates that the resistance
of the learner.

.
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demonstrated by disturbed children to thinking about their
activity, i.e., the reflexive aspects of abstraction, is
at least partially related to the emphasis on perceptual

stimuli and the passive absorption of information so

rampant in the educational programs designed for these
children.

Emotionally disturbed children already exhibit strong
tendencies to avoid the connections between action and
states

(Reid,

1978)

.

Emphasis on learner passivity within

the classroom environment further exacerbates their

problem.

It has been suggested that it becomes increasingly

difficult for children to participate actively in their own
learning experience when the curricular emphasis is on

perceptual stimuli and passive absorption of information
from teachers and texts (Piaget, 1974)

Because disturbed children are often enslaved by

patterns of action they are currently unable to change,
it is especially problematic that behavior modification

programs do not often provide experience with developing

new perspectives, generating alternatives or recognizing

relationships and transformations between objects and
events.

would
If these experiences were provided, they

view to include
have the effect of expanding the children's

change-oriented
the development of more transformational,
focus less on
thought processes, and as a result help them
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only the static elements in situations that they are

involved in socially, emotionally or academically.
Related to the Teaching Process

.

For Skinner, the

educational process, and the teaching process in particular,
is simply the technique of arranging the contingencies of

reinforcement under which children learn.

Teachers must

set up consequences, occurring in the school environment,

that follow from the child's action, emphasizing positive

reinforcement.

Behaviorist-oriented pedagogy supports a closelystructured, teacher-centered learning environment in which

control is an important element.

The teacher is the

primary controlling agent, functioning in that capacity

through his selection of information to be learned and

construction of appropriate situations to accomplish stated
goals via manageable incremental steps and reinforcing of

behaviors that approximate the desired learning.
Since learning may be defined in terms of
responses to discriminative stimuli under
conditions of reinforcement and since
teachers are charged with the task of
arranging these so as to promote learning
(Skinner, 1968), it follows that in a very
real sense learning is held to be contingent
upon teacher behavior (Wedell, 1975, p. 73).
basis
Behavior analysis fails to provide an adequate
goals
or framework from which to select educational
which is
(MacMillan and Forness, 1970). The methodology

maladaptive behavior to
so powerful in terms of changing

.
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more acceptable behavior is not matched by concern for how
broad educational goals are determined.

"Teachers are

provided with an efficient means of taking emotionally

disturbed children someplace but are not substantially
aided in the selection of where to go"
196 9, p. 525)

(Hewett et al.,

.

Lacking a developmental framework, as would be
provided in other systems, e.g.

,

Piagetian or Deweyan, the

teacher is left with a certain gap which is filled on the
basis of arbitrary decisions.

Grass and Kreger (1978)

criticize the wide-scale use of performance objectives

which provide a generalized list of sequential goals
without being limited to any specific developmental hierarchies and without offering any guidelines for methodological intervention.

Wood (1968) and MacMillan and Forness (1970a) express

concern that teachers may be provided only with the
powerful technical tools of behavior modification and not

equipped at the same time to understand its implications
and potential misuse.

These techniques have the marked

disadvantage, as do many such tools, of being morally
blind.

applications
It is relatively easy to learn the

concommitant
of the technique, but there is usually no
of its possible
training of teachers in the ramifications
abuse

a

.

Conclus ion

Behavior modification, according to MacMillan and
Forness

(1970a)

gives no direction in determining educational
goals; it reduces constructs of learning,
motivation and reinforcement to simplistic
terms on occasion. To the unsophisticated
practitioner, it may be blinding to broader
frames of reference
and may preclude
children from learning how to learn and thus
becoming independent of teachers as such
major goal of education (p. 296)
.

.

.

—

Critics warn against the confusion of an appropriate
use of behavior modification techniques as an expedient

to make certain aspects of education and classroom organi-

zation possible for disturbed children, with the inappro-

priate use of the approach as a means for constructing

knowledge (MacMillan and Forness, 1970a; Forman and
Kuschner, 1977).

Education, according to this critique,

is more than a change in behavior, but particularly with

disturbed children, it is an increase in consciousness of
self and in awareness of the transformations regulated and

coordinated by the learner.

Behavior modification is not

ideally suited to or designed for eliciting awareness of
actions performed

— an

awareness that is crucial for

disturbed children both in organizing their meager sense
of self- as- actor and in discovering the transformations

that can be made on objects and ideas in order to avoid

their predominantly static modes of learning.

106

This approach, with its system of external reinforcements, tends to promote the learning of specific facts in

piecemeal fashion.

Given the fragmented quality of a

disturbed child's learning profile, this fractionalized

curriculum with separate isolated pieces of information
fosters neither the development of a more organized network
of knowledge nor the developmental processes necessary in

acquiring and constructing knowledge more independently.
"Behavior modification may be an effective means to

produce or eliminate certain [maladaptive] behaviors that
prevent the child from interacting with the materials"
(Forman and Kuschner, 1977, p. 118).

However, once a

child is focused on the materials, this approach is

inadequate to encourage the necessary exploration, selfinvoked questioning, determining of relevant problems and

searching for appropriate information that is required for

disturbed children to improve their social, emotional and
cognitive skills.
It should be clear from the general appraisals of

this approach that much of value can be derived from the

behaviorist paradigm.

MacMillan

and Forness

Its critics would agree with
(1970a)

that this "strategy has

but
tremendous potential for work with atypical children;
its
although its use with these children is promising,

misuse could be terrifying."
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Four Selected Areas

Four areas have been singled out for specific

consideration in this study:

a)

emotional conflict,

b)

problems with social, emotional and cognitive autonomy,

3)

the role of error, and

4)

the role of active inquiry.

The first two have their origins in the problematic and

pathological development of disturbed children, while the
latter two originate within the educational setting in

which the children function.

They are selected for closer

examination because they indicate together the interactive
and reciprocal impact between the nature of these children
and their environment.

The problems experienced with

conflict and autonomy result in pedagogical problems for
the children and the roles of error and active inquiry are

likely to affect their social and emotional as well as

cognitive development.
Furthermore, these areas were selected because they
focus on aspects of emotional and educational growth that

have long-term impact on development, as opposed to the

short-term, specific aspects usually considered by the

behaviorist approach; and because these areas are inadequately addressed by this approach.
Emotional Conflict

.

Emotional conflict appears to

regardless of
be a common element in disturbed children
the variations in specific problems.

Its genesis may
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proceed from a variety of emotional, psychological,
physiological, social and environmental factors beyond the
scope of educators to assess.

Yet its existence within

these children is a pervasive and powerful force to

consider in educational planning.
In more normally functioning children, conflict can

be evoked through occasional specific events and anxiety

may well result.

This is part of a healthy, well-function-

ing human response system.

Yet emotionally disturbed

children demonstrate a quick and continuous response to
situations that would ordinarily seem uneventful and not

apparently appropriate causes for conflict.

It is the

chronic nature of the phenomenon that renders it so
powerful; its pervasiveness in these children affects

virtually every experienced event.
This chronic conflict can be viewed as a characteristic readiness to react with emotional charge in response
to real or imagined dilemmas.

It is manifested in a

variety of ways in classroom behavior; sudden outbursts of
rage, anxiety attacks over small decisions, agitated move-

ment and verbal responses, inability to utilize sufficient
self-calming tactics, intense hyperactivity or sullen,
passive withdrawal.

Existing behaviorist-oriented programs tend to treat
utilizing
the conflict superficially and symptomatically,
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strategies that attempt to eradicate the behavioral
manifestation.

This teaching strategy does not allow, much

less encourage, the child to deal actively with his own

conflict; it does not foster the construction of a reper-

toire of his own tools with which to "tame" the anxiety
and panic resulting from this conflict.
An analogy here might be helpful.

In the case of

beginning instrumental string-players, correct intonation
is a most fundamental problem and is very difficult to

The aural dissonance usually present can be viewed

attain.

as analogous to inner conflict.

One educational strategy

is based on constant, external correction:

That's flat.

sharp.

board."

"That's too

Your hand is too high on the finger-

This approach attempts to eradicate the dissonance

directly from without by changing the existing behavior.
A contrasting approach is to have the student learn to hear
the dissonance, to become in-tune with his own

out-of-

tuness" and through this to begin to change his intonation

accordingly because of his own internal dissatisfaction.
his own tools
He then begins to develop a repertoire of

to help attain this goal.

Educationally, this would trans-

provide experilate into programmatic planning that would
different kind of
ence in handling cognitive dissonance— a

conflict that is external and manageable.
the first
A significant problem resulting from
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approach is the lack of transference.

The student learns

only a mechanical piece of data, e.g., "If
lower,

I

won't play too sharp."

I

keep my hand

Whereas, the contrasting

approach leads to an internalized system of discrimination
that can then be applied to other areas of music to deepen

the understanding and broaden the scope of knowledge.

Current programs of the behaviorist mold tend to
ignore the connection of the child's inner conflict with
the educationally productive use of cognitive conflict.

Simply providing an environment of reduced conflict will
not modify the way in which the child experiences and

interacts with the world.

In fact, his view of his own

turmoil may be intensified in this way.

It is an age-old

solution to temper with an opposite, whereas here the

metaphor of innoculation might be more appropriate.
In failing to introduce manageable cognitive disso-

nance, current programs fail also to promote coping

strategies so vital to the educational growth of disturbed
children.

Intellectual, Social and Emotional Autonomy

.

The

of
initial development of autonomy begins with the onset
of a
some level of abstraction, i.e., the acquisition

developmental representation of "other" in the infant's
the separateness
ment and a growing awareness in time of
development
This is closely connected with the
of self.

Ill

of object permanence in both its forms -- with reference to

the permanence of material objects.

This developing skill

evolves into the ability to retain a mental picture or
image of the object when it is no longer in view.

It is

also referred to as object constancy and is used with

reference to both people and material objects.
This process is somehow short-circuited in most

disturbed children.

As a result, first there is a loss in

object-constancy of meaningful others in their lives, and
following that a possible delay in developing object

permanence of material objects.

This developmental delay

causes problems for disturbed children in their sense of
their growing separateness as individuals, and concommitantly with their growing conceptual frameworks.

This

connection between intellectual and emotional autonomy has
been documented by Feffer, Feffer and Gouravitch, and
Feffer and Suchotliff (in Overton and Gallagher, 1977).
Related to this is the child's ability to recognize
and empathize with others, to acknowledge their perspective,

to accept his own boundaries as well as the boundaries of

others.

Emotionally disturbed children tend to experience

a great deal of difficulty with the socio-emotional aspect

of this developmental task and a connected difficulty with
its cognitive counterpart which is seeing issues, events

and models from other perspectives.

,

.
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Xt is necessary for an educational setting to provide

an active role for the disturbed child in learning his own

parameters and to encourage respect for the perspectives
and boundaries of others in order to foster the emotional
and cognitive growth toward a healthier functioning.

Current behaviorist programs do not acknowledge the
importance of this task, nor do they provide appropriate

experiences for its development nor establish the connection between its socio-emotional and its cognitive aspects.
These programs, by virtue of their teacher-centered
emphasis (Safford, 1978; Reid, 1978a; Schmid-Kitsikis
1976)

and their characteristic external reinforcement, fail

to provide adequate opportunities for developing an appre-

ciation of another's perspective in relation to the child's
own.

Qualitative changes do not occur in acknowledging

another's perspective from having particular responses
reinforced, but rather from placing into juxtaposition his
own responses and those of other children as well as

authority figures (Forman and Kuschner, 1977; Furth, 1969)
Having the "correct" social rules or perspectives

presented externally and typically via the teachers'
authority does not encourage the kind of equilibration
required to develop social autonomy or awareness of self
and respect for others.

.

113

Role of Error

.

The way in which an educational model

addresses error is crucial in determining the efficacy of
its program.

"The effectiveness of any teaching program

critically hinges on the management of the wrong response"
(Blank , 1973)
It has been the prevalent viewpoint among special

educators, particularly those teaching disturbed children,
that one great advantage of a behavior modification

approach is its organization of curriculum sequences into
simple, discrete increments which are intended to eliminate
the opportunity for error (Harshman, 1969; O'Leary and

O'Leary, 1972; Honig and Staddon, 1977).
Yet productive use can be made of error in at least

three ways.

It has significant potential for purposes of

diagnosis, for aiding affective growth, and for stimulating

cognitive development.
1.

Diagnostic Use of Error.

Because behaviorist

programs minimize the occurence of error in their attempt
to organize instructional programs sequentially in small

incremental elements, the teacher has little opportunity
through
to gain insight into a pupil's pattern of inquiry

particular child
a diagnosis of the kinds of mistakes that
makes.

insight
It is especially important to develop such

patterns of
in teaching disturbed children since their
from
functioning are o ften erratic and quite different

. .
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those of normal children, and their educational profiles

tend to be irregular.

The pedagogical thrust of behaviorism

restricts the diagnostic use of error as a critical source
of such insights.
This is not to say that in cases where the material
is simple that errors should automatically be introduced

or encouraged, but rather that many areas of the curriculum

should contain broader, more complex tasks that do not lend

themselves to successive approximations or small incremental
steps

More broadly conceived tasks of problem-solving allow
a teacher to gain insight into a child's intellectual

processes and strategies, and to plan more appropriate

activities each day.

The errors and mis-strategies that

normally occur can be used as important diagnostic information to indicate how the child structures his picture of
the world, the ways in which he would transfer this knowledge and the cognitive methods he brings to bear on the

data
2.

Error and Affective Growth.

In traditional

systems, error was simply wrong; it was punished or extin-

guished, and in the process it was often the source of a

child's shame and regret.

In attempts to avoid this

educationally unproductive use of error, behaviorist
these
programs for disturbed children do tend to avoid

.
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aversive controls, but they employ equally narrow
techniques.

They exchanged aversive controls and punish-

ment for positive reinforcement, but retained the narrow
intellectual approach, adding smaller incremental steps
in each process, leaving intact the externality of the

reinforcement
Trying and failing in school

— or

anywhere

profound impact on a child's view of himself.

— has

a

In order to

build self-esteem in this area a program that simply avoids
error misses significant opportunities for producing growth
in disturbed children;

it must instead develop strategies

for comfortable risk-taking which may well lead to error.

Because of the often bizarre affective response that

disturbed children may have to the experience of error, it
is understandable that a behaviorist approach attempts to

alleviate this reaction by minimizing the occurrence of
error.

The notion is that this gives the child a chance

to experience successful participation and receive positive

reinforcement in the classroom.

While this is true, there

is another side of the issue to be considered.

Learning

to accept the affective consequences of risk-taking

behavior, and hence error, is a slow but vital process in
the emotional growth of a disturbed child.

The behaviorist

approach, in reducing the occasion of error for short-term
need.
needs, does not deal with this critical longer-term

.
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The issue of self-esteem is important in a behaviorist

system.

Yet the building of confidence tends to be founded

on small successes and the avoidance of error.

This does

not encourage more broadly conceived intellectual tasks

such as hypothesizing

,

making judgments, predictions and

estimates, posing and solving problems, taking a critical

view or imagining another's perspective
lead to error.

— all

of which might

To provide a safe environment for these

tasks, to foster the gaining of satisfaction through such

risk-taking, to feel comfortable with error and its rami-

fications are important elements in a program for disturbed
children.
3.

Error and Cognitive Development.

If error is

considered pernicious, or even simply unproductive, this

certainly places a premium on success and correct responses.

Current programs do not emphasize error:

a)

as interesting,

provocative, and rich in possibility for insight into the

child's own structuring of knowledge;

b)

as an interesting

response which really answers another equally valuable

question to be pursued at some other point; or

c)

mistaken departure which suddenly seems to signal

as a
a new and

productive approach, or imparts insight into a new problem.
They instead tend to sacrifice the richness of outcome to
the safety of small, correct answers which do not generate

anxiety

.
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Behaviorist programs, then, do not allow for, let
alone encourage, the productive use of error for cognitive

development.

Even allowing error to occur is counter to

behaviorist procedure.

Consequently, disturbed children

are not given a chance to see their errors as potentially

fruitful, leading to a new direction, or giving a sudden

new insight.

This aspect of their education is important

for these children for whom error and failure often signal

the end rather than the beginning of a cognitive learning

sequence
In a behaviorist-oriented approach error, therefore,
is clearly programmed out whenever possible

Hewett
1972)

.

,

1968; Honig and Stadlon,

(Harshman, 1969;

1977; O'Leary and O'Leary,

Yet the confrontation of error has certain implicit

value which is by-passed in such programs.

For instance,

coming to terms with a wrong response often solidifies a
of the
right response, leads to the gradual internalization

evaluative
"rules" that are applicable and affords the child
teacher
techniques which can be used independently of the
(Blank, 1973, pp.

88-89).

coordinate his own
If not given the opportunity to
instead experiincorrect view with another viewpoint, but
immediately
ences no chance for error or has an error
does not become
corrected by teacher or text, the child
own mistakes in a
practiced in the process of viewing his

,
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meaningful context.

Kamii (1981) sees this process of the

child's examining his own error in the context of its

contradictions or inadequacies as crucial for both the

narrow goals of remembering the correct answer as well as
the broader goal of coming to trust his own thought

processes.

Children whose errors are handled in the

behaviorist manner, Kamii maintains, will come to distrust
their own thinking.

Another consequence of behaviorist "errorless
learning" is that the children fail to learn what to ask

on their own with respect to the problem and the materials
involved.

Nor are they learning to develop or test their

own hypotheses.

If one aspect of learning is "discovering

what information is relevant to a particular problem, then
learning to learn is learning to discover what information
is relevant to a particular problem"

1977

,

110)

p.

(Forman and Kuschner

.

Basically, behaviorists fail to recognize that errors
do not necessarily arise from the child's inaccurate

perception of empirical phenomena, but often from the
or
absence of an appropriate framework to incorporate
1978,
organize the perceived information (Schmid-Kitsikis
not
Therefore, the behaviorist approach to error
,

p.

359)

.

diagnostic material to
only does not allow for appropriate
productively with regard
be gained, and does not use error

. .
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to affective and cognitive growth; it fails to understand

the significance and origin of error in certain contexts.
Role of Active Exploration and Inquiry

.

Programs

designed for disturbed children underestimate the power of
active exploration in cognitive development.

"These

children are more likely to perform exercises and drills
rather than to explore their environment and to pursue
their own interests.

Drill, programmed learning and M-

and-M's do not encourage reasoning.

Exploration does"

1978, p. 227)

(Reid,

There is a behaviorist tendency to view knowledge

acquisition as the absorption and accumulation of infor-

mation from the external world rather than as a process
of construction.

The attempt is made to impart information

to the child, a passive receptor.

The learner is seen as

a receiver of predetermined products of a discipline rather

than as an investigator of the structure underlying a

discipline.

description;

Reid's observation further supports this
"These practices assume a passive learner,

diagnosed and
a fixed body of knowledge and skills to be

remediated, and fixed approaches to learning problems"
(Reid,

1978, p. 227)

emotionally
Active exploration is also important for
acquisition or
disturbed children as a contribution to the
current programs
strengthening of personal identity. In
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children are not encouraged to formulate their own limits
and boundaries with respect to cognitive, social and

emotional parameters.

Because of this passive role

assigned to the child in a behaviorist approach, he is not

often given the opportunity to set his own limits--

intellectually or socially.

He therefore gets little

practice in constructing the borders of his identity.

Active decision-making is likely to aid in developing

a

sturdier self-concept and particularly when those decisions

pertain to children's own limits.

More of this would be

useful in a setting for disturbed children.
This absence of active exploration in behaviorist

programs is particularly reflected in the choice of curri-

culum materials.

"The notion that special needs children

require stimulus- lean environments may have evolved as a

way of getting children to attend to highly evolved tasks
that are not developmentally appropriate"
p.

2

02)

,

(Meisels, 1979,

and moreover are not absorbing or motivating.

Cruickshank et al.

(1962)

describe this reduced-stimuli

environment for disturbed children as follows:
Learning is conditioning; environmental stimuli
should be reduced, as should the physical space;
provided and
a structured school and life plan
to
the stimulus value of the materials designed
and
cope with the particular psychopathology
teaching directly to the disability.
on exploration
This view indicates the severe limitations
systems.
characteristic of behavior modification
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It is this active involvement of the knower

transforming objects in his environment that is often

missing in behaviorist special education programs, and
which could function as a powerful motivating force for
disturbed children.

This kind of interaction with the

materials in the child's environment--this changing,
preserving, reversing, rearranging, enhancing--is the
basis of cognitive growth as viewed by certain critics of
the behaviorist paradigm (Forman and Kuschner, 1977; Kamii,
1971; Furth and Wachs, 1975)

.

Its underemphasis in

current programs is seen by them as problematic.

CHAPTER
CONSTRUCTIVISM:

V

THE CONCEPTUAL

FRAMEWORK
Before elaborating a constructivist pedagogical

alternative to behavior modification it is necessary to
examine the conceptual foundations of constructivism.
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to present a
brief outline of the main conceptual elements of construc-

tivism as developed by Piaget.

This conceptual framework

will indicate the principal differences in orientation that
set this approach apart from that of Skinnerian behaviorists

,

and will also provide the conceptual bases for an

alternative pedagogy for emotionally disturbed children.
If behaviorism tends to be guided by a mechanistic,

unilinear metaphor that emphasizes the passive relationship
of the organism to an external environment, constructivism
is conceptually more biological and multidimensional,

bringing in dynamic interactions between

a

range of

physical, internal psychological and external social variables.

Piaget's formulation can be viewed as a set of

orienting attitudes or concepts in which theoretical
elements have been drawn in large part from empirical
observations.

In the Piagetian description of cognitive
122

,
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development important formulations are based on the
processes of adaptation and their relation to psychological
9^^iizat ion , with emphasis on the principle of active

construction and dynamic equilibration.
Piaget's epistemological perspective provides the

overarching framework for his formulation of constructivism,
and hence it is well to begin with this.

The notion of

active construction is a basic guiding principle that

permeates other components of constructivist theory and

should be clarified next.

Of the four

f actors--maturation

experience, social transmission and equilibration--which
in Piaget's view, most significantly influence cognitive

development, the fourth factor, equilibration, is the most

contribution and the one that is critical in

unique

pulling the other three together.

Since the overall

function of the equilibration process is seen as adaptation,
a description of this principle follows rather than precedes

the discussion of causal factors in cognitive development.

A summary of the Piagetian conception of the stages
of cognitive development is presented at the end of the

chapter.

These stages, considered by Piaget to be invari-

ant, are perhaps the best known feature of his conceptual

framework.

While they are often used as a point of depar-

ture by students and practitioners

,

it is contended here

that using this as the total reference point diminishes,
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if not distorts, the potential significance of the richness

of Piagetian thought.

Consequently, prior attention is

given to the foundations of Piaget's conceptual framework
as a more productive point of reference than the stages

per se.

General Epistemological Perspective
Historically, classical epistemology was the province
of speculative philosophy, with little in the way of

empirical study to support any given position.

Piaget

criticized the use of speculative methods with

(1971)

respect to epistemological questions and advocated the
study of children's actual cognitive development to

determine the nature of knowledge and the process by which
it is acquired.

His self-appointed task, as an epistemologist

,

has

been to apply observational techniques to child behavior
and extract data from those observations on which to base
his theory.

He describes his endeavor as genetic epistemo-

logy (Piaget, 1970, 1976).

This epistemological viewpoint incoporates elements
of both Humean empiricism and Kantian rationalism.

Piaget

relation
stresses experience but not human passivity in
to it.

in
He also stresses human organization patterns

even shaping
thought as giving meaning to experience and
rationalists
perception. From Piaget's perspective, the

.
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and the empiricists failed to see that each was emphasizing

only half of what is an integrated interactive process, a

cycle of dynamic and reciprocal influence.

Piaget rejects as separate alternatives both the

empiricist and the nativist approaches.

He rejects the

nativist, preformed, innate categories of knowing into

which sensory stimulation is channeled, as well as the
empiricist consideration of the developing organism as
completely subject to environmental contingencies.

Development in the first instance is then merely innate

maturational activation; in the second instance knowledge
is but a subjective copy of the external world.

Both are

untenable according to Piaget who instead views knowledge
as sets of dynamic relations

(Furth, 1969; Forman, 1980)

Objections were raised by Piaget to the reductive

atomism found in both modern behaviorism as well as in
classical empiricism.

These disciplines have attempted to

explain patterns of intelligent adult behavior in the same
terms as the infant or lower animals; higher, more complex
of
forms are then viewed simply as incremental additions

homogeneous elements.

Piaget's developmental view sharply

organization
contrasts in its emphasis on different forms of
are inexplicable
at different levels and on structures that
as mere additions of homogeneous elements

(Mischel, 1979).

he emphasizes
The theory is interactionist in that
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the dynamic interrelationship of subject and object, of

knower and known.

It is constructivist in that the process

of coming to know is viewed as an active construction

originating in internal structures and organizational
abilities from within the knower.

Principle of Active Construction
Piaget differs from Skinner in some very basic,

elemental ways, one of which is his assumption of an active

organism as opposed to Skinner's view of an essentially
passive organism.

He sees this active element in the very

beginning of child development, with an infant who controls
in some sense the procuring and organizing of his own

outside experience.

At first the activities that organize

patterns of resulting experiences are physical, directed

toward objects and events in the environment.

The scope

of possibilities expands as the child grows and his range

of exploration continues to increase.
At a later point in this developmental process, these

external activities also develop an increasingly significant
inward dimension and include symbolic and more sophisticated
on
use of language to represent actions and operations

objects and ideas.

In fact, for Piaget, thought is essen-

internal
tially interiorized action in an effort toward

organization and growth.

.
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Understanding the dynamic quality of transformations ... is dependent on activity, at
first actual, then internalized and finally
reversible.
The child must act on objects
and transform them in order to comprehend their
nature (Reid, 1978, p. 205).
.

.

.

Thought, then, may eventually proceed almost entirely

without direct reference to physical actions in the
environment, although its origins are deeply rooted in
Instead, the older child or adolescent is

such action.

capable of representing mentally the physical world and

proceeding by means of memories, imagery, language and
symbols

While Skinner focuses exclusively on behavior, Piaget
views the same behavior as not merely a response to the

external stimulation of the environment.

He also sees in

the reaction of the organism evidence of its underlying

structural aspects.

From this biological perspective, the

stimulus is not viewed as fully formed, separate and

external to the organism and only acting upon it.
In the Piagetian position, all levels of behavior

indicate aspects of construction deriving at least

partially from the organism's intrinsic structure.

This

structuring aspect is identical with meaningful, knowing
behavior.

"To know is therefore an activity of the

sense
subject and knowledge is a construction in the true
of the term"

(Furth, 1969, p. 15).

and
Piaget rejects the demarcation between perception

.

128

abstraction, maintaining that even rudimentary perceptual

information is gained as a result of constructive activity
of the organism interacting with sensory data.

Knowledge,

for Piaget, is never a state, whether subjective, repre-

sentative or objective; it is never static but always
dynamic.

It is an activity.

Knowledge can be viewed as

"a structuring of the environment according to underlying

subjective structures or as a structuring of the subject
in living interaction with the environment"
p.

(Furth, 1969,

20)

Four Factors in Cognitive Development

Piaget's articulation of four factors responsible for

cognitive development is central to his theory.

According-

ly, the following section presents a close, if condensed,

look at these factors as a composite drawn from primary and

secondary sources (Piaget, 1970; Gallagher and Reid, 1981;
Furth, 1969; Pulaski, 1980; Wyne and O'Connor, 1979).

In

the Piagetian conception, then, cognitive development is
the result of the interaction of four essential factors:
(a)

physiological maturation,

transmission, and

(d)

(b)

experience,

(c)

social

equilibration.

Maturation is seen as a necessary but insufficient
condition to explain cognitive growth.

This is not a

unfold.
maturational theory; development does not simply
as a factor, it is
So while Piaget acknowledges maturation
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not highly emphasized in his theory.

Experience is divided by Piaget into three major
areas:

exercise, physical experience and logico-mathemati-

cal experience.

The first refers to those actions which

do not lead to new knowledge.

The second refers to the

manipulation of objects that leads to the discovery of
properties; it is the action of noticing the positive

characteristics of objects which Piaget calls affirmations.
He describes the process as one of empirical abstraction

,

indicating his belief that properties do not impose themselves on a passive mind, but rather the knower abstracts

them from the objects.
The third kind of experience is emphasized in Piaget's

theory and is rarely mentioned in other theories.

It too

is gained from one's own activity with objects but indirectly so, by reflecting on those activities, drawing out infer-

ences and relationships, developing logical rules that are

applicable to any objects.
as reflexive abstraction .

This process Piaget describes

Although it too is originally

bound up with knowledge drawn from acting on objects, it
is not dependent on the continuation of that activity upon

the objects themselves, but eventually becomes contentfree.

Knowing that the sum of objects counted is inde-

pendent of their order, for example, is originally based
logical
on counting and arranging a set of objects, but the

.
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rule drawn from that process gradually becomes independent
of those or any objects.

While physical knowledge is gained through affirmation as described above, logico-mathematical knowledge is
gained through the construction of negations or the under-

standing of nonproperties of objects, e.g., a red ball is
not square and not blue.

Thus, it is sufficient in physical

knowledge to affirm the positive aspects of objects as in
empirical abstraction? in reflexive abstraction it is

necessary also to exclude logically properties that do not
obtain.

These kinds of activity /knowledge relate also to
Piaget's notion of the figurative/operative distinction.

Figurative refers to the knowledge of states or configurations of reality as gained through perception or imitation.

Operative refers to cognitive functions required to understand transformations; operations are described as inter-

nalized mental actions.

Figurative knowledge depends on recognition of the

configuration of the stimulus, while operative knowledge
involves inference-making at some level.

There is a general

progression toward the use of operative knowledge in a
predominance
child's development, de-emphasizing the earlier
1980b)
of the figurative aspects of knowing (Forman,
reflexive
The interrelationship of empirical and

.
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abstraction, of figurative and operative knowing is of

central importance in Piaget's view of cognitive development.

The common element is activity, which provides the

foundations for both perceptions and concepts.

Knowledge,

then, for Piaget, unlike Skinner, is not a process of

copying reality, but is founded on the knower's actions
upon objects to transform them and the connected activity
of thinking about the outcome.

Social Transmission is the third factor in explaining

cognitive development.

It is gained through social and

cultural interaction, through the development of social

relationships and through the use of language and communi-

cation between individuals.

The impact of social inter-

action is strongly felt by children.

There is a certain

intensive exchange of ideas in a group of children

in

terms of what is noticed, what is selected for focus, and

especially in terms of recognizing other perspectives and
incorporating the disagreement or disequilibrium in some
way
system
The importance of social activity within this
statement:
is clearly illustrated in the following

"Witho

others the
interchange of thought and co-operation with

operations into
individual would never come to group his
The emphasis
163).
a coherent whole" (Piaget, 1967, p.
just as it is with
here is on active social involvement
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respect to active involvement with objects.

A child's

passive presence in a group will not necessarily assist in
the coordinations of mental actions just as passive

recognition of objects will not yield any understanding
of relations between those objects or between the objects
and the observer.

This view of social interaction is a dynamic one,

implying active contribution to the working group and
active involvement in the shifts and balances that occur

within it.

"Such a system of human relationships replicates

the properties of mental operations.

It allows the child

to become, himself, an action within a co-ordinated system
of actions"

(Richmond, 1970, p. 95).

Social interaction is one method that is especially

effective in promoting decentering
egocentrism.

—a

relinquishing of

It reveals the perspectives of others and

suggests that the child's own view is not the only possible
choice.

This typically leads children into conflict and

into justifying and clarifying their views.

Such clari-

fication has both affective and cognitive components.
without
Affectively, it suggests agreeing on a group issue,
terms with
socially inappropriate behavior and coming to
Cogniopposing views and with the feelings of others.
clear and persuasive
tively, it suggests making one's ideas
on one's side.
in order to convince with rationality

.

.

"
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Equilibration is the fourth factor responsible for
cognitive development; it is a final one that pulls

together and coordinates the other three and renders them
effective in promoting development.

In Piaget's view, none

of the other three alone or in combination can account for

cognitive growth.

Equilibration is proposed as a dynamic,

ongoing and self-regulating process which "acts as a

motivating force between the increasing competence of the
child (maturation) and his growing range of interactions

with objects and people (physical and social experience)
(Pulaski, 1980, p. 192).

This factor of equilibration is thought by Piaget to

structure internally and organize the developing intelligence, providing the self-regulation through adaptation to

external and internal changes.

It is a unifying principle

invoked to explain the impelling force in cognitive growth.

Invoking it does not mean that Piaget reduces the importance
of the external experience.

On the contrary, Piaget sees

environmental factors as the medium in which intelligence
functions and with which it interacts

Particularly through this concept of equilibration,
theory.
Piaget demonstrates the biological emphasis of his
dynamic notion
His view of intelligence is based on this

structure into
that brings order, lawfulness, purpose and

behavior

134

The term equilibration is used to refer to the process
of self-correction or self-regulation because it leads to

increasingly advanced states of equilibrium within the

cognitive system.

Its purpose is to eliminate contra-

dictions and the conflict between expectation and outcome.

Central to the development of Piaget's genetic epistemology,

equilibration illustrates the reciprocal nature of the
relationship between knower and known.

It functions to

reorganize on a higher level what is learned from co-

ordinating the knower' s own activity in the construction
of rules and principles.

Equilibration is the essence of adaptive
functioning which for Piaget is constant at
all levels of development, even though the
states of equilibrium characteristic of each
level or stage differ qualitatively from one
stage to the next (Pulaski, 1980, p. 14).
Principle of Adaptation

Adaptation is the overall aim of the equilibration
process.

It is a central concept in Piagetian thought and

species.
is the essence of the biological functioning of all

between its
It is a dynamic force, cyclically moving

components— assimilation and accommodation.

Assimilation

ideas, sensations, or
is the process by which experiences,

the organnourishment are taken in and incorporated into
continuously balanced
ism's own activity. This process is
organism is in an outgoing
by accommodation in which the

.
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mode, adjusting to the impact of the environment.

In

Piaget's view, it is the dynamic interaction between these
two elements that makes possible both physical and cognitive

development
The assimilation-accommodation balance is seen as a

continuous fitting of old structures into new functions and
the concommitant changing of new structures to suit old

functions under changed conditions.

The developmental

process, then, originates from what already exists,

demonstrating a continuity with the past.

Simultaneously,

current structures change in response to new demands.

Adaptation is basically a concept, having its origins
in the discipline of biology from which Piaget extrapolated
it, and applied it to human development.

His procedure has

been to describe structures functioning at each age level,

demonstrate the ways they adapt to one another and to

environmental demands

,

and how these structures simultane-

ously modify what the environment demands.
An important application of this biological frame of

reference can be seen in Piaget's use of

schema.

It is

to the
of interest to consider this term in contrast

behaviorist "response.”
differentiated.
"response."

Schema may be simple or highly

to
In its simplest form it may be similar

than
However, it is usually more complicated

includes a
"response," in that "the schema generally
II

.
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variety of acts in many different circumstances, not just
a response to a specific stimulus," and also is more

mobile, being amenable to application to a variety of

objects (Baldwin, 1967, p. 174).
"Schema" is used not only for overt actions,

classified within the sensorimotor stage, but also for more
complex cognitive functioning or interiorized action.
Piaget believes that the latter derive from the former via
a process of internalization.

The visual image, for

example, evolves from the action of looking.

Development

is partly explained in terms of the intricate evolution of

simple, primitive schemas into broader, more operational

systems
The dynamic force of development can be seen at work
in Piaget's notion of assimilative schemas.

In a given

situation, certain aspects are assimilable but not

completely assimilated and therefore evoke a schema,

motivate its use until the situation has been mastered.
As a result, the schema becomes a usable tool, but the

activity having been mastered no longer is attractive or
motivating.

Perhaps a novel feature of the situation will

is
capture the child's attention until some equilibrium

reached again.

In this fashion there is a broader range

of organized
of situations covered, and a greater array
177).
systematic schemas results (Baldwin, 1976, p.

.
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The accommodation process accounts for the necessary

modifications in those assimilation schemas.

Thus,

assimilation and accommodation are complementary and occur
simultaneously, balancing each other to insure adaptation.

Adaptation is closely connected to the organization of the
organism.

In the process of organizing his activities, the

individual assimilates novel events and simultaneously

accommodates existing structures to meet new demands of the
environment.

As a result of these tendencies toward

organization and adaptation, new structures are continually
in a process of construction in the interaction with the

environment
Stages of Cognitive Development
Genetic epistemology divides cognitive development
into four stages:

(a)

sensorimotor stage

(1-1*5

which coordination of action is emphasized;

(b)

years)

in

pre-

operational, or representational, stage (2-6 years) in

which internalization of actions begins;

(c)

concrete-

operational stage (6-11 years) in which reversible

operations and relations among objects are characteristic;
and

(d)

formal-operational stage (11 or 12-adult) in which

relations between relations are typical.
In the first stage, the child progresses from

beginnings
limited reflex action through the rudimentary
in the gaining of
of mental representation as demonstrated

.
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object permanence.

There is initially an egocentric lack

of differentiation between the infant and objects in the

environment.

The gradually achieved ability to comprehend

the permanence of objects

significant people

— is

— both

physical objects and

the supreme achievement of this

stage
The object, according to Piaget, involves more than
the child's perception of it as occupying space in the

external environment and possessing specific describable
properties.

In order to comprehend the object in even the

most rudimentary fashion, the child must come to know it
as separate from himself and as independently existing.

This task represents the first crucial step away from the

extreme egocentricity of infancy.
The preoperational

,

second stage is characterized

by symbol formation, beginnings of language comprehension,

and mental representation.

The child at this stage is not

yet able to use these symbols to operate logically on the

environment, but he has gone beyond the sensorimotor stage
why
in knowing that some changes do not make a difference,

they do not and how to express this knowledge in language.
with a
This period reflects a time of increasing fluency
informavariety of symbols, which aid in going beyond the

tion perceived in the immediate present.
logically
Concommitant with the inability to operate
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is the continuation of some form of egocentric functioning,

namely the inability to see another's perspective

tively and socially.

— cogni-

The preoperational child truly

believes everyone views the world as he does, his own

perspective is assumed to be objectively true and absolute.
What exists for him in dreams or imagination exists equally
for anyone else.

He infuses the world with animistic and

magical thinking, viewing his environment as alive and
purposeful as he himself is.
The preoperational child maintains a narrow, rigid
and egocentric perspective, unable to focus his attention

beyond the immediate configurations or separate states,
unable to focus on transformations between separate states.

Predominant in his cognitive functioning is what Piaget
calls the figurative aspect of thought, focused on the

perceptual elements of objects.

Yet, with all of these

developmental limitations acknowledged, it is important
to note that at the end of this stage the child is typically

moving toward the more systematic, logical thought as
revealed, for example, in the ability to conceive and to

handle class inclusion or seriation problems.
The third stage, concrete operations, is a period in

which the child develops the ability to think deductively
a form of abstract thinking

limited in scope and range,

— although

such deductions are

based on witnessed events.
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The thinking characteristic of this period is, then,

deductive, but the content of thought is real objects

rather than other deductions (Forman, 1980b).

It is the

beginning of organizing thoughts into coherent structures
and arranging them in various relations.

The fourth cognitive stage is called the formal

operational period and is characterized by logical operations no longer directly or necessarily bound to objects.

Operations become the content of thinking.

The child can

think about thought, reflect on ideas as well as think
about concrete objects.

He is able to formulate and compre-

hend general laws or principles which underlie particular

instances, deal with purely hypothetical concepts, entertain

logically notions which my be physically impossible.

Piaget

describes this sophisticated level as hypothetico-deductive
thinking.

These limits of cognitive development represent
successive stages, each of which builds on its predecessor.
The achievements of earlier stages are not discarded in

favor of newer, more sophisticated versions; rather, those

achievements are incorporated, restructured and reorganized
to form more advanced complex forms of functioning.

Piaget

views the child's cognitive development as a continuous,
toward
connected and consistent progression, spiralling
from each stage
formal operational thought, with patterns

/

.
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being successively reorganized and incorporated into the
next

These stages of cognitive development clearly
represent an important contribution to the field.

But,

as indicated at the beginning of the chapter, it is a

mistake to focus on them as a point of departure in
dealing with Piagetian concepts.

This misplaced emphasis

has in fact been problematic in many American applications
of Piaget and has often led to misguided attempts to

accelerate development.

The epistemology, the principles

and factors in cognitive development, not only the stages,
are central to his thought.

They are also the most

productive reference points for discussing pedagogical
implications and applications, which is the next task of
this study.

CHAPTER
PEDAGOGY OF CONSTRUCTIVISM:

VI
IMPLICATIONS FOR

LEARNING NEEDS OF THE EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED
Building upon the conceptual framework of the

constructivist approach, what are its pedagogical implications for dealing with learning needs of emotionally

disturbed children?

This chapter begins with a general

resume of the relevance of the constructivist perspective
to the particular characteristics and learning needs of
the emotionally disturbed.

It then examines more speci-

fically how this approach would deal differently with the
four critical areas previously identified and used as

reference points in the critique of behaviorist pedagogy
(Chapter IV)

.

The chapter and study concludes with an

indication of some areas that need further study and

development if the constructivist alternative is to be
employed more extensively and effectively in the education
of emotionally disturbed children.

Relevance of Constructivism for the Education
of the Emotionally Disturbed
As indicated earlier in this study, a behaviorist

children
approach to the education of emotionally disturbed

certain
may be considered appropriate for dealing with
142
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short-term educational needs and superficial manifestations
of this disorder.

Indeed, it is the limited, immediate

and concrete quality of the approach that has contributed
to its appeal and widespread use in educational programs
for this group.

But in many important respects the

behavior modification approach, in dealing with external

symptomatic behavior, converges with, rather than corrects,

predispositions of the emotionally disturbed.

It does not

touch the variety, and complex interaction, of variables
that lie at the root of the disturbance.

Consequently, it

does not represent a viable approach for serving interme-

diate and longer term needs that must be met if more

thorough and sustained growth is to be achieved.
The contribution of the constructivist alternative
is that it provides a lens for recognizing the nature and

interactive relationship of significant variables
affective, cognitive, social and psycho-motor.

represents a more sound basis for diagnosis

,

— the

It thus

a more

complete frame of reference for prescriptive action.
The relevance of the constructivist perspective for
the education of the emotionally disturbed may be summarized
by relating components of its conceptual framework,

dis-

cussed in Chapter V, to selected characteristics of
IV.
emotionally disturbed children described in Chapter

priorities for
A constructivist view of educational

.
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disturbed children focuses on developing intrinsic

motivational patterns and excluding as much as possible
external reinforcement strategies in more complex learning
situations.

There is emphasis on the child's taking more

responsibility for his own processes of inquiry and

consequently increasing his intrinsic motivation and his
striving for independence and competence.

In de-emphasizing

external motivation, the constructivists minimize the
problems of maintaining interest, of transferring learning,
and of transition from dependence on reinforcer or external

authority.

Dewey corroborates the point stressed in this
approach:
If the subject matter grows out of the child's

own past doings, thinkings, and sufferings, and
grows into applications in further achievements
and receptivities, then no device or trick of
method has to be resorted to in order to enlist
'interest'

(Dewey, 1902, p. 27).

Piagetians would draw out the child's interests in similar
ways and begin the curriculum spiral that employs an idea
or problem at sequentially different levels, each time

seeking higher order thought process
This approach focuses on broader intellectual issues
and avoids presenting these in small increments.

Instead

with or is
the child is given whole patterns to deal
part of an
encouraged to break tasks down for himself as
It avoids a narrow, figurative
active construction.

.
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emphasis which would focus on simple properties in favor
of fostering inference, prediction, analysis, and in

general a pattern of reflective thinking.

In so doing,

this position assists the children in developing frustration

tolerance which is crucial in their battle with impulsive
responses.

More complex cognitive experiences are likely

to lead eventually to delayed responses, a habit of thought

that can then influence the ways in which these children

approach other social and cognitive problems
The static modes of thinking and learning characteristic of emotionally disturbed children are treated by the

constructivists as idiosyncratic but not categorically

different from earlier levels of development.

According

to this approach, these children are capable of progressing
to more operative forms of thought and the active curriculum
is designed in part to alter their static focus.

Emphasis

object
is always on the transformational character of

relations and events.

This affords the opportunity for the

from
children to escape the circular pattern which moves
inquiry
static focus to passive involvement to lack of
functional
skills or methods to solidifying the overall

pattern.

Constructivists hope to break the circle, inter-

more internalized
jecting active methods and consequently
for the children in
motivation and greater self-confidence
to comprehend.
their own abilities to transform and
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The overaccommodative reality-distorting aspects to
the pathology of this group, their difficulties with

object-permanence, symbol-referent confusion and perspec-

tive-taking are addressed by the constructivists partly
through the use of active methods of inquiry and partly

through emphasis on developing autonomy.

The self-regula-

tory, autonomous character of the knower in acquiring

knowledge is a sought-after quality in the development of

these children.
The educational strategies to accomplish changes in

their over accommodation include encouraging them to make
changes in their environment, to manipulate objects, to
alter them so that the children experience- a sense of

appropriate power and will feel less compelled to distort
reality as a protective device.

These same strategies

foster a stronger sense of self as distinct from others
and the outside world, allowing appropriate boundaries

and consequently moving toward a more autonomous stance.

Other prominent features of disturbed children's

educational patterns are avoidance of conflict, functional

confusion between symbols and referents, a general egocentric perspective and a characteristic impulsivity.

Constructivists view these as intricately interwoven
functioning and
aspects of cognitive, emotional and social
problems in
recommend a curriculum which confronts these
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terms of providing active involvement in social and

cognitive

decentering or perspective-taking tasks,

practice in determining some of their own social

boundaries and limitations, and participating intensely
in a social context designed to elicit stronger self-

concepts

.

An important element brought to bear in this

approach is the teacher's emphasis on knowledge about the
child, about the ways he typically constructs knowledge
at given levels, about the idiosyncratic ways in which

the disturbed child carries out similar tasks.

Dewey's

(1902)

concern over the fractionalizing of

curriculum into discrete and separate disciplines, bounded
by class-time and textbook, is shared by Piagetian

constructivists.

The universe is fluid and fluent,

according to Dewey and a traditional curriculum fails to
reflect this fluidity.

Piagetian educators attempt to

meet the disturbed child's fractionalized, fragmented view
of the world with a curriculum based on principles of

continuity and connection.
These recommendations from constructivists are
of
representative of their general approach and indicative
is organized
the way education for disturbed children

within such a system.

The following section, devoted to

in more detail
discussion of the four critical areas, deals
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with the educational implications of the constructivist
position.

Implications in Four Critical Areas

Earlier in this study the behaviorist approach was

criticized partially in reference to its adequacy as a
pedagogical guide for handling four areas:

emotional/

cognitive conflict; intellectual, social and emotional
autonomy; the role of error; and the role of active

inquiry.

The relative merits of the constructivist

approach have been implicitly or explicitly indicated in
this critique, as well as in subsequent discussion of
Here the intent is to summarize

constructivist concepts.'

the distinctive constructivist orientation, and discuss its

pedagogical implications, in each area.
Emotional /Cognitive Conflict
Changes take place by virtue of
consists in
Development
conflict.
the production of contradictions as much as
in their resolution (Hass, 1977).
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Disturbed children, as described earlier in this
study, typically experience intense and chronic emotional

conflict.

The inadequate treatment of behaviorist programs

with regard to this issue was also delineated.

The con-

structivist approach to this pernicious and pervasive aspect
different
of the children's functioning takes a totally
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direction.

Instead of extinguishing the behavior indicating

such conflict, constructivists attempt to provide real and

manageable contexts in which to encounter a cognitive

version of conflict.

This is educationally planned,

elicited conflict; it is induced by the environmental
situations designed by educators for this purpose.

While conflict and tension in the raw emotional
versions bring about anxiety and discomfort for these
children, cognitive conflict plays a central role in

intellectual growth.

It addresses indirectly the

intensity of their chronic emotional conflict; its use in
an educational program provides the children with necessary

experience and consequent strategies that lead to better
resolutions in the cognitive area

—a

process which might

parallel the management of emotional conflict as well.
Academic tasks carry with them a modicum of emotional

distance which can be used to introduce these children to
conflict in a non-threatening way.

It is easier for them

to handle an intellectual dilemma than a social or intense

emotional one, particularly if it is carefully introduced
and actually elicited by a curriculum plan.

This arena

their
provides an opportunity for children to practice

intellectual coping strategies.

Such experience can be

could eventually
slowly increased within the curriculum and

mechanisms to
serve as a means o f transferring coping
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experience in daily living as well.

There is then an

on-going spiral of confidence in intellectual areas

contributing to social/emotional competence, which in
turn enables them to attempt more intellectual encounters

with cognitive dilemmas.
Not only in terms of their specific needs as disturbed

children, but also in more general terms of intellectual

development, it seems necessary to experience a certain
amount of cognitive conflict.

What is presented to the child should match
his present cognitive structures and should
challenge him in the sense of providing
optimal conflict so that through accommodation and assimilation, cognitive restructuring
can take place with consequent development of
the cognitive structures (McNally, 1973, p.
94).

This conflict-inducing strategy can be descriptively

sketched as follows.

The teacher places himself near the

children as they actively work out the solution to a
given or self-imposed problem.

If the children have

worked out an intermediate solution, taking only some data
into consideration, the teacher will then introduce a

contrasting object or an idea or material that conflicts

with the current solution, giving the children the
opportunity to incorporate the conflicting data, but at
the same time offers no correction of their formulation.
did
This introduces a paradox in which what was expected
or
not occur but rather there was a transformation

.
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variation of the expectation (Forman and Hill, 1981,
33)

p.

.

Such a conflict-inducing procedure presupposes, of
course, appropriate prior curriculum decisions.

Classroom

tasks ideally are derived from the children's own experience,
as authentic problems arising from experiences with inter-

esting data found within the classroom.

A teacher has the

option of introducing problems although this is most

effectively accomplished as a result of prior observation
of the child's interests, strategies, levels of cognitive

and social functioning and previous patterns demonstrated

on other tasks
The teacher must be able to ask puzzling questions

which evoke conflict or contradiction, which in turn
evoke the need for another perspective or the need to

reexamine an overlooked aspect.

He must be able to

the
structure those questions on the spot while observing

child's particular perplexities and insights.
to help
A specific suggestion to evoke conflict and

occupied by
teachers convey the continuum- like place
easily recognize
opposites and thereby have children more
by Forman and Hill.
their transformational nature is made
pairs, each with
Options should be provided not just in
with at least one other
its diametrec opposite, but linked
to
"The middle choice is often used
middle choice.

.
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generate the conflict necessary to reconcile the opposites,
like the boy who realized he could not call the middle sized

doll either tall or short, so he called it a little tall"
(Forman and Hill, 1981, p. 40).

This kind of strategy would

make the conflict definitely experienced but probably

manageable for a disturbed child.
Constructivists, in stressing conflict- inducement as
a positive curriculum strategy, address the issue described

earlier of the disturbed child's own experience of emotional conflict.

Providing an educational dimension of

managing conflict is likely to produce better strategies

with which they can come to terms with their emotional
conflict
This approach affords opportunities for the child
to resolve conflict and for him to reflect on that resolu-

tion process

— both

activities are important in transferring

what is learned to the area of emotional conflict.

It is

an extrapolation from a specific cognitive event to a more

generalizable affective awareness.

The interaction of

cognitive and affective elements has been delineated in
several contexts earlier in this study.

Its importance is

noted once again with reference to conflict.

Gains

promote
achieved in one context are felt in the other and
some change there too.

The process takes on a spiralling

of relating
motion affecting the child's overall patterns

.
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to cognitive or emotional conflicts.

The constructivist's way of addressing this two-

sided issue has the distinct advantage of dealing actively

with the emotional conflict.

This is in contrast to the

behaviorist approach, presented earlier, which treats the
symptoms of the conflict with the simplistic hope of

eliminating their mainfestations through appropriate
reinforcement.

Constructivists are attempting to aid the

child in restructuring his relationship to conflict, to
put him more in control of its pervasive effects and not

merely to gloss over its superficial aspects.
This procedure has another advantage over a behaviorist method.

Instead of focusing on past reinforcements,

the child is encouraged to predict consequences in a

future oriented way.

It leads attention away from factual

memory and toward the anticipation of results

a more

productive strategy for disturbed children who, as we have
seen, tend to fix on static aspects and focus on current

states without looking forward or thinking predictively

Such prediction with respect to conflict— inducing situations
is important in any context of the curriculum.

A third advantage of promoting cognitive conflict has
he finally
to do with the child's actively owning the answer

the
provides, as opposed to the passive acceptance of
of the teacher
"right" answer, suggested by the authority
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or text

,

appropriately reinforced in a behaviorist system.

The concept of learning for the constructivist

includes knowing that one event is a variation on a

previously known theme as well as how that is the case.
It is a process of knowing why irrelevant stimuli are in

fact irrelevant and how those selected fit into a previous

cognitive framework.

This kind of data is best drawn

from active participation in a curriculum designed to

elicit independent responses to planned cognitive conflict.

Piagetians applying the theory in classroom settings

deliberately plan for induced conflict as a response to
materials, experiences, questions or problems posed for
the children (Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, 1974; Case,
1976)

These approaches are organized in ways designed to

.

elicit cognitive conflict as part of a continuing, planned
process of inquiry.

They are not linear programs with

specific responses expected.

Rather, they have open

possibilities of resolution, but the conflict is a built in

feature.

This is important for disturbed children even

though its use may require additional emotional support
in the initial use.

This would be necessary until these

children were accustomed to this new model of inquiry.

Duckworth (1979) suggests that this feature of
conflict should be evident in a rich problem-eliciting/
is more
problem solving environment which, in her view,
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important than attempts at matching specific curriculum
tasks to specific levels of each child.

Autonomy
It is by exercising his ability to govern his
own beliefs and actions that the child gradually constructs internally coherent knowledge,
morality, and personality (DeVries, 1978, p.
88 )

.

The development of autonomy is comprised of two

separate but highly integrated aspects:
tive.

social and cogni-

Each has a significant impact on growth, with

reciprocal influence of each exerted upon the other.
The development of social autonomy is a complex

process rendered more so because of the complications of
social relationships as experienced by disturbed children.
It begins with an egocentric view of the world and ideally

progresses beyond this stage.

It is one aspect of social

development within a general context of social interaction.
Social interaction, and indeed the entire realm of

social functioning is, for Piaget, a fertile ground for

restructuring the early egocentric patterns of children.
Disturbed children, particularly, experience grave problems
context
with this development and the deficiency in this

other
further contributes to regressed functioning in

social and cognitive areas.
demonstrated
The primary mode in which this problem is
individual, or
relates to seeing the perspective of another

.

,
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rather disturbed children's failure to do so.

It is

relevant in both its social dimension, i.e., seeing an
event or problem as another person sees it, and in its

more cognitive dimension, i.e., visually representing an
object or event as rotated in space as if viewed from
another standpoint.

These are interconnected abilities

and difficulty with these for disturbed children seems

often to be followed by difficulty progressing into more

complex facets of thinking.
For this reason, it is important to focus on the

possible ways in which to address this issue in educating

disturbed children.

In order to do this it is important

to begin with the initial view of the self that is to be

distinguished from others in this developmental ability
and to consider how constructivists address this in

contrast to behaviorists
A constructivist view emphasizes the relationship

between the individual and his environment or social frame
of reference, and defines this relationship as completely

reciprocal, dialectical and interactive.

A human being

as an active subject determines the world and the environ-

ment; at the same time he is being determined by that

world.
qj- 0

According to this perspective, self and society

inextricably woven together

,

maintaining

,

changing

restructuring one another in an interconnected fashion.

.

.
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The self, then, is not passively determined by the
social

order, but rather is actively responding to the social

order in which it functions; it derives its form from that

dynamic interaction.
In contrast, according to Skinner, self-concepts

which are based on a feeling of autonomy are culturally
fostered illusions.

The appropriate meaning assigned is

expressed by Skinner in the following statement:
A self is a repertoire of behavior appropriate
to a given set of contingencies, and a substantial part of the conditions to which a person
is exposed may play a dominant role.
The
identity conferred upon a self arises from the
contingencies responsible for the behavior
(Skinner 1971)
,

According to this view, the only type of self-awareness that is not illusory involves the individual

1

s

ability

to discriminate the operant properties of his own behavior

which serve as sources of control for himself and social
others

Given these contrasting views of the self in relation
to its environment, it is predictable that the constructivist view would address the developing of perspective-taking,

with differentiation of self from other and with the
educational implications of these issues as a major thrust
in changing the functional patterns of disturbed children.

The behaviorist tends instead to treat particular behaviors
in particular instances without reference to such underlying
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development.

Perspective-taking can be seen as a tool, a device
of thought that helps to

decenter a child's view and to

orient him toward a more logical frame of reference,
aiming for the kind of thought shared in a community of
inquirers.

"We must strive to lead the child to construct

for himself the tools that will transform him from the

inside

— that

surface"

is,

in a real sense and not only on the

(Piaget, 1973).

Egocentricity is characteristic of early child
development.

Differentiation between self and other, self

and objects, self and events occurs only gradually.

It is

a slow and difficult process for all children and depends

a great deal upon the quality and intensity of the child's

experiences and the patterns of interaction between himself
and significant others in his world.

It is a far more

difficult and complicated process in disturbed children
whose self-other differentiation is typically inadequate
(Cowan, 1978; Schmid-Kitisikis

,

1976?

Reid, 1978a, 1978b).

These children characteristically exhibit
functional repertoire of limited

a

decentering abilities

and a fusion with persons, events and objects surrounding
them.

Because the fusion and confusion often render the

distinction between self and other quite blurred, such
children experience great difficulty in moving away from
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egocentric patterns of viewing the world.

mental context, the ability to

In a develop-

decenter, to take the role

or perspective of another, is seen as a special case of a

more fundamental capacity to departicularize the focus of

conceptual activities and learn to consider and coordinate

simultaneously two or more points of view (Langer, 1969).
Because of their affective and/or cognitive develop-

mental delays, disturbed children tend to remain at this
level of egocentrism, in a state of recurrent subject-

object confusion which operates to confine an individual
to a singular and highly personalized point of view while

denying to others the uniqueness of their own vantage
(Chandler, 1977).

They fail to progress from that phase

— being governed from
autonomy — internal governing of

which Piaget describes as heteronomy
without; the attainment of

oneself does not develop properly if at all.
fail to accomplish is:

(a)

a

What they

mode of functioning charac-

terized by independence and self-reliance as well as

(b)

an increasing comprehension of other points of view, of

notions of fairness, justice and equality.
1970)

Anthony (1956,

corroborates this in his research:
Under pathological conditions such [autonomous]
development might fail to occur with the result
that the child remains an undifferentiated,
heteronomous individual, highly dependent on
external authority for his attitudes and
behavior (Anthony, 1970, p. 731).
assessment
For educational and diagnostic purposes,
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procedures have been developed to measure a child's
ability to

decenter.

These strategies require subjects

to describe objects or events from multiple points of

view while maintaining a single position.

The tests have

focused on both visual perspective and social and inter-

personal contexts.

Severely disturbed children have

demonstrated highly significant deficits in identifying
objects depicted from other viewpoints, in adopting

different social roles and in acknowledging another
individual's personal viewpoint (Neale, 1966; Chandler,
1973; Chandler et al., 1974).

Anthony (1956) found that

disturbed children demonstrated significant egocentricism
in both interpersonal and impersonal contexts.

The implications tend to be maintained throughout

different types of situations (Feffer, 1959; Feffer and
Gourevitch, 1960, Feffer and Suchotliff, 1966).

Disturbed

children tend to have difficulty decentering or developing
role— taking abilities in all contexts.

This nonegocentric

form of thought, as Piaget (1970) views it, is not simply

synonymous with accurate social judgment but refers instead
view,
to the ability to anticipate another's possible

precisely when they differ from one's own.
views that
It is this ability to anticipate other
and cognitive
has far reaching implications for social

development.

Socially, it is the beginning of empathy.
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which is crucial in satisfactory interpersonal relationships.

Cognitively, it is the beginning of a more

objective, non-egobound view of the world, of inquiry

unfettered by one's own subjective preferences and views.
Feffer (1970) argues that because decentering is a crucial
element in the developmental structuring of experience, the
inability of a disturbed child to accomplish this task

contributes significantly to his pathology and his retarded

development in both social and cognitive areas of functioning

.

"Various impersonal cognitive problems, such as

conservation of liquids and more interpersonal problems,
such as the coordination of multiple points of view, are

regarded as formally similar" to the perspective-taking
(Chandler, 1977, p. 117).

skills

The basic skill involved

is simultaneously considering and coordinating multiple

dimensions

—a

task which can be viewed as an essential

ingredient in most later formal operational thought.

Rubin

has found that impersonal cognition (person to

(1973)

object)

and interpersonal cognition (person to person) are

based on the same underlying decentration process.
The connection between social and cognitive aspects

with
of development, then, are especially highlighted
respect to autonomy.

Piaget views the cognitive development

social
of reciprocity as a correlative aspect of the

.
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development of personal independence (Piaget, 1973).
Chandler (1973, 1974) has shown that planned

experience with role-taking does effect changes in the
levels of social adaptation on the part of individuals

demonstrating delayed egocentric patterns of thought.
This research suggests that a constructivist approach to

decentering tasks in the classroom would foster movement
away from egocentric patterns typically exhibited by

disturbed children.

The research addressing the connection

between the social and cognitive aspects of this develop-

mental question for autonomy further suggests that progress
on either side affects the progress of the other (Chandler,
1973, 1974; Rubin, 1973).

Thus developing educational

plans that will aid a disturbed child in improving his

decentering skills in a social area will have significant
implications for this cognitive growth.

Piaget views this

process as not only remedial but as interactively spiralling

toward improvement of the child's overall social and

cognitive adaptation (Piaget, 1973)
In Piaget's view, social interaction is often

responsible for stimulating questions, contradictions and
the consequent reorganizing considered necessary for
learning.

It is, of course, a prior condition that the

recognize
child have a sufficient amount of competence to

interaction
the contradictions presented in the group
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process.

It is still the child’s own activity that

eventually determines a pattern of reorganization,
but
the stimulation experienced in productive peer group
dynamics is often an important aid in development.
Piaget sees this dynamic as less likely to set up
the typical dependencies found in teacher-centered

situations and to allow contradiction to be experienced

without pressure to accept the teacher's "right" answer or

without trying to please the teacher.

The group membership

in early developmental stages provides an enormous influence

in changing intuitional patterns eventually into opera-

tional structures, and dependent behavior into more

independent functioning.
If developing social autonomy depends largely on

providing classroom experience with role-playing or other
activities that will encourage perspective-taking, then

cognitive autonomy, being closely aligned, requires
similar strategies.

Its development requires both the

social versions of perspective-taking which interact with
the cognitive side, as well as intellectual tasks that

require viewing problems, strategies, visual or auditory

materials from another's point of view.
In order to further enhance the development of

autonomy, the teacher must refrain from applying external

reinforcement

— at

least in certain tasks.

Giving children

—
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praise

— even

though preferable to negative criticism

reinforces their dependence on a controlling environment.
Giving them, instead, responses that encourage further

interactions that stimulate creativity and reasoning
strengthens internal regulation and independent thinking.

A teacher, according to this constructivist position,
should avoid giving praise as well as criticism, either of

which labels children's responses good or bad, right or
wrong.

Instead they should be allowed to enjoy their

problem-solving efforts.

Teachers might better be alert

for new problems to pose in order to improve upon their

methods whenever necessary (Forman and Hill, 1981).
Thus intrinsic reinforcement affects children's

autonomy as well as it affects the quality and effective
Developing their own patterns

transfer of their learning.

of independent thought is crucial for disturbed children

whose dependence otherwise impedes their willingness to
risk and to inquire actively.

irrespective of developmental
level, can be assisted in the world view,
that static states are momentary positions
in time, this helps them organize discrete
events into a useful, functional scheme,
and that in turn gives the locus of control
and assists the
back to the child
an autonomous self
of
construction
child's
40).
p.
Hill,
1981,
(Forman and
If children,

.

.

.

This does not mean that in a constructivist system

children will have complete freedom or that the teacher

.
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takes an extreme permissive stance.

On the contrary, the

teacher functions as an authority figure, much needed by

disturbed children for a feeling of security, but the
authority of the teacher is not total, nor is it exerted
unnecessarily.

Educational planning is carried out with

an eye toward cooperation between child and adult as well
as among children, and with the focus upon the teacher

setting the stage for the child's activity.
To the extent that a child is motivated extrinsically
and generally reinforced or controlled externally, he is

prevented from developing an autonomous pattern of functioning, of governing himself on the basis of convictions,

values and knowledge constructed by himself.
Special children are regarded as needing special

structure

—a

proposition which has most often resulted in

needed
a behaviorist approach designed to apply measures
to attain such structure.

Rigid schedules and sequences

are
are totally inappropriate for these children and they

follow
likely to be less able than normal children to

may not
such rigid programming or teaching styles which

approximate their own learning style.
inner
To attempt to supplant their lack of
imposed,
externally
is
structure with one that
Where
altogether.
is to avoid the issue
internal structuration is lacking, children
organiwho are not helped to achieve better
of their
mercy
the
at
zational strategies are
rely
must
they
whom
on
parents and teachers
for
activities
and
to organize their thinking
them (Reid, 1978b)

,
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Classroom settings characterized by cooperative
learning environments, as recommended by constructivists.
have been shown to facilitate cognitive and social

development, and to maintain gains over time (Doise,

Mugny and Perret-Clermont

,

1975;

Knight-Arest and Reid,

Furthermore, these children were able to use

1979).

logical and unique arguments in explaining what they
learned.

The explanations reflected genuine cognitive and

social changes, not merely imitation.

Using instructional strategies of cooperative effort
in the classroom for building social and cognitive autonomy

then, is an extension of Piagetian principles.

The success

of such strategies has been documented in several areas.

Cooperative learning was found effective:

(a)

in academic

content areas and in the acquisition of basic skills;

(b)

in greater mastery of higher level questions and advanced

problem solving strategies, accompanied by success in
specific information gains; and

(c)

in social and affective

these
gains, more altruistic behavior, and the transfer of
1980;
gains across academic/social boundaries (Sharan,

Slavin

,

1980; Lazarowitz

,

Sharan and Steinberg, 1980).

Role of Error

Mistakes
embedded
nodules.
knack of
anything

are at the very base of human thought
there, feeding the structure like root
If we were not provided with the
being wrong, we could never get
useful done (Thomas, 1974, p. i/).
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Error, for the constructivist, is not something to
be eliminated from the child's educational horizon.

Rather,

it serves a myriad of productive uses, as sketched earlier
in this study with respect to the behaviorist inadequacies

in this context.

It is useful as a diagnostic tool for

teachers to draw upon, as an opportunity to increase the

affective strength of disturbed children via developing
safe forum in which to risk and to err.

a

In the realm of

cognitive development, error is significant in yielding
insight for the child into his own interpretations, in

suggesting interesting new approaches to other questions
if incorrect in this instance.

Its occurrence solidifies

the right response in a more internalized way and as a

result fosters retention of material (Blank, 1973; Forman
and Kuschner, 1977).

In terms of broader goals like coming

to trust one's own thought processes, and finally in

developing a self-correcting, self-regulating approach to
learning, error is a significant factor.

Learning takes place through attempts to compensate
assimilative
for the disturbances occuring when inadequate

schemes are applied.

Errors, in this sense, are the very

source of growth (Reid, 1978b).

Piaget views contradiction

which knowledge
and error as motivating forces, without
view, if error and
would remain static. According to this
which in turn
contradiction lead to the compensations

.

.
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foster re-equilibration of structures

,

it follows that

incremental learning steps designed to eliminate error will
lead, at best, to the acquisition of information but not

to higher levels of development.

We human beings are, according to some scientists,

programmed for error and should use it as a stepping stone
in inquiry.

Other creatures do not seem to have DNA
sequences for making mistakes as a routine
part of daily living, certainly not for
programmed error as a guide for action.
The lower animals do not have this
splendid freedom. They are limited, most
of them, to absolute infallibility (Thomas,
.

.

.

1974, p.

39)

Errors are seen as essential extensions from the

child's current concept to a more advanced, more equili-

brated level, as ways of reworking his knowledge base.

De-emphasizing dichotomies generally, and particularly with
the
respect to right and wrong, correct or incorrect, paves

continua of
way for viewing responses or solutions along

comprehensiveness and
adequacy, appropriateness, efficacy,
This avoids in the educational setting itself
so forth.
response as characteristhe devastating impact of a wrong

tically experienced by disturbed children.

This view

to accommodate
restructures the process of knowing itself
dichotomies or polarized
this notion of continua instead of

opposites
progression toward a
Then each error is seen as a

.
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more fully equilibrated response, a dynamic flow of

developmental change which elicits less anxiety in children
already over- anxious about potential failure.

Such a

procedure renders their errors self-informative,
of feedback in a larger pattern of inquiry.

a

process

This process

builds a child's competence in handling ideas and sense of

confidence in his ability to function more independently
of the teacher's correction or praise (Blank, 1973; Forman

and Kuschner, 1977)

Once again the intrinsic/extrinsic alignment in the

constructivism/behaviorism comparison is relevant.

With

respect to error, here it is the disturbed child's own

self-regulatory process that restructures an unworkable
or erroneous solution; it is not an external authority

figure reinforcing a right response.

This intrinsic/

extrinsic contrast between the two systems has been examined

with respect to many issues in this study.

The treatment

of error by the constructivists supplies still another

contrast by virtue of the intrinsic handling of error by
the child himself.

He is the locus of control, although

appropriate
the teacher retains an important role of posing
the
questions and/or materials to foster the initiation of

child's self-regulation.

,
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Active Inquiry

Subject-matter never can be got into the child
from without.
Learning is active.
It involves
reaching out of the mind.
It involves organic
assimilation from within (Dewey, 1902, p. 9).
Active inquiry includes activity brought to bear on
objects, active thought about the relationships and continuities between objects and events, as well as active focusing
on the transformational elements and properties as opposed

to static descriptors of objects and events.

According to

Piaget, children must not be encouraged merely to respond
to the environment but rather to act upon it.

Cowan (1978)

uses the metaphor "interactive generator-transformer" to

describe the child as learner, a term which he bases on

Piagetian epistemology.

It suggests the dynamic relation-

ship of the child to his environment and the active mode

which inquiry must take.
Thus activity functions in a constant way in a

constructivist curriculum although at some developmental
stages it is more overt and obvious, more directly related
to objects, while at other later stages it is less directly

related to objects and events in the environment.

In

attempting to teach some principle at early stages, the
terms,
initial presentation should be couched in concrete

with direct manipulation involved.
upon objects.

The activity is focused

Then the activity can become more internal-

and motor supports
ized and schematic by reducing perceptual

.
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from objects to symbols or from motor action to speech.

Significant supporting data regarding the importance
of active exploration for functional and conceptual growth

have come from the field of psycho-biology.

Because these

experiments dramatize so powerfully and, in another mode
of verification, demonstrate the importance of this kind
of activity for learning, several are described here.

Experiments were performed in which visual perception

was distorted by artificial lenses--those that inverted the
picture of surrounding space, or those that divided left
and right into blue and yellow, are but two of many

examples.

Subjects were divided into groups either passive

or active in their approach to their new perceptual

experience

.

In all cases, the active, exploring group

adjusted and corrected the distortion while the passive
group experienced difficulty and often never accommodated
at all

(Kohler, in Restak, p. 1979, p. 116).

Kohler concluded that the accuracy of our perceptions
from the
about the world and our extraction of knowledge

data both depend

on our ability to actively explore our

environment
of
Drs R. Held and A. Hein reared a litter
time
kittens in complete darkness until the
kitten
of their ingenious experiment. One
was then freed to explore the environment
second
while dragging a basket containing a
the
(A pully arrangement enabled
kitten.
the
through
second kitten's basket to move
.
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same territory covered by the active kitten.)
These researchers discovered that the first
kitten, the active explorer, developed perception, while the passive animal remained blind
(Restak, 1979, p. 117)

.

Thus Restak, in analyzing this research views the

process of developing a picture of reality as an "act of
Even if the probabilities are skewed

construction."

— as

in the experimental distortions or the kittens' initial

deprivation, and ensuing impressions are "wrong," correction
can be made if there is an opportunity to interact with

the stimulus.

He sees the results of this research as

emphasizing the role of activity in perceptual learning
and in cognitive development in general.

The role of active exploration in cognitive develop-

ment is again demonstrated in an experiment of Dr. Mark
Rosenzweig in which he sought to find the impact of

environmental stimulation of actual physiological brain
growth.

In the experiment, three contrasting environments

were contrived:

in the first group single rats remained

the
in the standard laboratory group cage with two others;

confinesecond group consisted of single rats in solitary
the
ment, having no opportunity for social interaction;
and
third or enriched environment provided many toys
about.
larger space in which these rats could move

a

Then

the brains of each rat were examined.

enriched
In all cases, the rats from the
the number
in
increase
environment showed an
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of nerve cells and a greater weight of cerebral
cortex, along with a thicker cortical covering.
In addition, important brain enzymes showed
significant elevations, which are thought to
correlate with a greater number of connections
between nerve cells and heightened cerebral
arousal (Restak, 1979, pp. 124-125).
In Restak 's view,

"the brain does not so much develop

as respond to tens of thousands of environmental variables."

One variable that the behaviorists often overlook is

novelty- seeking.

Psychologist David Hebb constructed an

experiment in which both a familiar, direct route and an
unfamiliar, circuitous route were offered to rats and

contrary to a behaviorist expectation, the novel, new path
was chosen as often as the familiar (Restak, 1979).
Perhaps, then, novelty itself is rewarding, as well as the

explorations involved in the process.

This finding lends support to the data collected by
educators and epistemologists suggesting that active inquiry
promotes cognitive development in a way that passive absorption of information never could.

It tends to corroborate

knowledge,
the constructivist view that in order to acquire
acted-upon, maniputhe environment must be transformed,
"The immature brain is dependent on
lated, explored.

development and
sensory stimulation for normal growth,
fact, been compared
function. Sensory stimulation has, in
to a 'nutrient'"

(Restak, p. 143).

approach comes
Further support for an active inquiry

.
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from advocates in the field of information-processing who
do not believe that mental representations are stored as

permanently organized cognitive maps, but are rather
actively reconstructed from sets of stored cues whenever
a specific issue or problem arises.

They view development

as the result of changes in the reconstruction rules

(Cellerier, 1976).

There is active process in the con-

struction of knowledge as well as in the up-dating and
restructuring of the methods of exploration themselves.
These findings corroborate the importance of

providing opportunities for children to explore, actively
inquire

,

reflect on their findings and restructure,

presumably each time on a higher developmental level.
The spiralling upward toward more sophisticated levels of

thought is certainly delayed and erratic for disturbed
children, as noted earlier in this study, but emphasis
educational
on the active, process-oriented aspects of

experiences would provide greater progress toward
1978a,
intellectual competence and independence (Reid,

1978b;

Schmidt-Kitsikis

,

1973; Cellerier, 1976;

Safford,

1978)

The Role of the Teacher

.

Acceptance of a Piagetian

activity in an educaframework concerning the primacy of
requires a considerational setting for disturbed children
predominating behavionst view
ble re-orientation from the
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First, it suggests a significant change in the role of the

teacher.

In a behaviorist setting, the teacher is typically

the active center of functioning, reinforcing responses of

the children to the transmission of knowledge.

constructivist setting, the teacher functions as

In a
a guide

to assist the child construct his own knowledge, to

strengthen the child's processes of reasoning, to promote
exploration, to present materials and devices that will

stimulate problem-solving and to provide counter-examples
that compel reflection and reconsideration of over-hasty

solutions

.

The role of the teacher in this paradigm suggests an

approach strikingly different also from a maturationist
view.

Piaget does not maintain that educators can sit

back and wait for maturation to accomplish the task of

developing reason.

On the contrary, he recommends that

educators can devise experimental situations to facilitate
the child's invention of knowledge.

Because intelligence increases, according to Piaget
(

and
1970 b) when the knower becomes sensitized to changes

only
becomes attued to transformations instead of focussing

made in
on static properties, every effort should be
change. The
educational programs to plan for emphasizing
children to
teacher should provide experiences that bring

terms with these active elements.
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As discussed earlier in this study, emotionally

disturbed children tend to focus almost exclusively on
static elements of their experience.

In order to overcome

this, teachers must foster an attitude of inquiry,

avoiding curricula based only on convergent thinking
models; secondly, they must plan for active involvement

with materials and open-ended, divergent inquiry; and
finally, they must emphasize the active transformations

occurring in and among objects and events, not merely the
passive observation of static states.
"Piaget demands that the teacher be an investigator

who is constantly observing, testing hypotheses, and

modifying materials and strategies to adapt to the child's
developmental propensities"

(Elkind, 1979, p. 10)

.

The

teacher, then, is expected to function actively also, as
child.
well as to foster active inquiry on the part of the
disturbed
This model of active functioning is important for

children.

the
It offers a transitional model of imitating

active methods demonstrated by the teacher.

It is a way

gradually to
of utilizing their dependence on authority,
and eventually
take on the active patterns they observe,
on authority toward
to move away from passive dependence
functioning. The locus of
a more active, independent
in the children,
organization must be increasingly vested
and absolute authority.
not in the teacher's centralized

—

.
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It is the teacher's job to support open-ended inquiry,

for without such support these children, as described

earlier, tend toward static, non-risk approaches and would
not be likely to expand their systems of inquiry and would

remain at lower levels of cognitive functioning.

The

teacher must undertake the on-going role of diagnostician

essentially in an informed way to determine how each
individual is processing the experiences provided and to

decide how best to provide the optimum challenge for that
child
The teacher's responsibility in a constructivist
setting, then, is not primarily to transmit knowledge in
terms of facts or concepts presented, but rather to

encourage the child's active participation on both physical
and mental levels.

This participation occurs on different

^0Y0^s each successively depending on the other.

First,

activity occurs at the motoric level in which the child
acts directly on objects, manipulating their physical

properties in space.

The next level involves developing

is no
intuitive internal versions of activity; this level

no longer
longer dependent on overt manipulation and
Finally,
limited by spatial and temporal restrictions.

and analytical
there is the level of verbal understanding
abstraction of activity.
thought, which is essentially an

that the higher levels
It is important to recognize
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directly depend upon the lower and that activity remains
a significant element even when thought becomes abstracted.

Importance of Social Interaction

.

For Piaget, social

interaction is an important element of the process of
active construction of knowledge.

The emphasis is similar

to the action upon objects in that for development to

occur, there must be individual action upon a human group

with ensuing response by the group.
presence

The child's passive

in a social group will not necessarily foster

the successful coordination of his mental actions any more

than a passive relation to objects will foster a full

understanding of the object.

The active participation of

a child within his social group implies his place as a

part within a whole, individually involved in the shifts
and changes of balance occurring within the group.

"Such

the properties
a system of human relationships replicates
of mental operations.

It allows the child to become

of actions
himself, an action within a co-ordinated system

(Richmond, 1970, p. 95).

common
Educationally, this suggests groups engaged in
for disturbed
activity an occurrence especially important
focusing on static
children who tend to react passively,

—

who tend to be
elements of a learning situation, and
This emphasis on
dependent upon authority for answers.
lead to the need for
group activity and inquiry would
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verification or justification of the child's own ideas, to
make adjustments to differing opinions and concessions to

contradictions and general discussion of these issues.
"As far as intelligence is concerned, co-operation is thus

an objectively conducted discussion (out of which arises

internalized discussion, i.e., deliberation and reflection)"
Once again, overt action sets

(Piaget, 1950, p. 162).

the initial stage from which internalized, higher level

functioning will develop later.

Curriculum Issues

.

A constructivist-based educational

setting is essentially an open system premised on learning

through active participation with emphasis on developing
the autonomy which is so problematic for disturbed children.
It is important for these children that they construct some

of their own boundaries and constraints and not have them

constantly set by external authority.

They typically

demonstrate inappropriate beliefs and fantasies, lack of
attention, and uncontrollable impulses, all of which tend
authoritato curb exploration or to provoke teachers to
and scope
tively curb exploration and restrict their range

of investigation.

With these characteristics in mind,

a constructivist

experiences that
educator would choose to plan curriculum
to investigate a perhelp the child to risk exploration,
the additional
plexing problem. The experiences have

.
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advantage for disturbed children of providing contact with
the world as others perceive it, of making predictions or

estimates about a real world that can be corroborated
outside their egocentric boundaries.
Papert (1980) recommends a curriculum along these
lines in which children construct their own "microworlds"

focusing on certain elements, assumptions and constraints
that allow exploration to be undisturbed by extraneous

questions of fact or accuracy.

They can then transfer the

personal skills and habits acquired in their microworld
to the more formal domain of scientific inquiry.

This

helps to avoid the dissociated relationship disturbed

children often experience in reaction to assigned content
not originating from their own involvement with materials
and ideas.

Such dissociation is seen by Papert to be often

responsible for a child's failure to learn.

They have been

forced out of meaningful relation to the material and have

adopted the most unproductive attitude of either noncompliance or rote learning to please the teacher

The constructivist emphasis of process and activity
in the education of disturbed children shifts the focus

considerably from the behaviorist perspective emphasizing
controlled.
content to be transmitted and behavior to be
on the
The focus of such an active program is clearly

approaches to the
process of developing resources, active
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environment which follows essentially William James'

definition of education:

"In the last analysis, education

consists of the organizing of resources in the human being,
of powers of conduct which shall fit him to his social and

physical world"

(James, 1899, p. 15).

Piaget's theory provides a conceptual basis for

viewing exceptional children in terms of capabilities, and
for understanding the compensations these children make

between their accommodations to objects and their assimilatory schemes.

Its emphasis on active inquiry and developing

autonomy, as well as its methods of dealing with error and

conflict, form the basis of an approach offered as an

important, effective alternative to the behaviorist paradigm

currently influencing the education of disturbed children.
Concluding Remarks
Because behavior modification has held such

predominant sway in the education of emotionally disturbed
children, this study has devoted considerable attention to
a

critique of behaviorist conceptual foundations and

applied practices in the education of this group.

This

inquiry has produced ample evidence to suggest the urgent
need to give serious consideration to an alternative frame-

work for viewing the problem and elaborating more effective
pedagogical practices, a framework that goes beyond the
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limited, unidimensional orientation of behaviorism.

It is

contended that constructivism provides an explanatory frame-

work that is significantly more sensitive and adequate for
understanding the dynamics of emotional disturbance and
growth, and yields an approach to pedagogy which is both

more sound and effective for the basic learning needs of
children with this disorder.

Consequently the conceptual

foundations of constructivism and the pedagogical implications of this approach have been examined.

While significant applications of the constructivist

perspective have been made in the education of normal
children (Furth and Wachs

,

1975;

Forman and Kuschner, 1977;

Kamii-and DeVries, 1977; Forman and Hill, 1980), the
extension of these principles to the education of disturbed
children is only just beginning.

When they have been used

with this group, the principles have often been applied
superficially.

There has been either a tendency to focus

directly on the developmental tasks per se, or to overemphasize the developmental stages themselves.

In either

case individual processes of learning are neglected.

What

application of
is needed is an increased interest in and

equilibration theory within these educational settings.
framework and
The approach should be pursued as a useful
understand and modify
vantage point from which to observe,

these children.
the particular strategies employed by
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What can be most productively drawn from Piaget's

work for application to the education of disturbed children
is his emphasis on independent inquiry
•

— on

learning how

This presupposes teachers who are prepared in

their knowledge of child development and who understand
how to pose stimulating problems and provide provocative

materials and experiences; teachers whose observations and
interpretations of children's actions are sufficiently
astute to plan in an on-going fashion for appropriate
levels of cognitive conflict.

The teacher in this model

must be able, through probing questions, to lead the child
to focus on certain productive aspects of an object or

event.

Then the next task would be to take the child's

responses and plan further questions or strategies that

will elicit growth.

Such educational experiences must be

arranged for disturbed children so that they can learn to

organize their own theories and activity according to

whatever idiosyncratic or tentative structures they possess.
If the constructivist alternative is to become a

viable and more practiced option in the education of

emotionally disturbed children there are a number of areas
where further development is needed.
In view of the tendency of practitioners to feel that

the nature of the emotionally disturbed indicates that

modifying behavior is the most that can reasonably be
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expected

,

one research need is to study more carefully the

actual educational options following from constructivist
theory.

Research on the connection between the experience
of chronic emotional conflict and the practice of induced

cognitive conflict might yield important findings which
could be productively applied in a constructivist educa-

tional setting.

There is a need to articulate the relationships

between impersonal and personal object permanence and the
consequent effect on emotional disturbance.

Understanding

the ways in which to compensate for this in educational

terms would be invaluable for the growth of these children.

Since the constructivist approach depends greatly on
the qualities and capacities of teachers, training strategies and methods need to be developed, as well as other

teacher support measures.

While constructivism may be a more demanding approach
that behaviorism within an educational setting, its appli-

cation as outlined in this study suggests promising results
emotional
in promoting long-term cognitive, social and

growth for disturbed children.

,
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